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Abstract 
Since the 2000s, several healthcare reforms have been conducted within the 
healthcare system in Germany. These reforms aimed at decreasing healthcare 
costs by introducing market processes into public services, among other means. 
This paper examines the policy preferences and the discourse concerning the 
reforms of the two dominant parties in German politics, the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU). It aims at revealing 
why the parties favoured and supported the particular reform policies. The 
partisan preferences are determined by applying the theoretical concepts of 
partisanship, power resources theory and a market-oriented power resources 
approach. This paper utilises the qualitative method of a discourse analysis. The 
expected preferences of the parties are compared with the political discourse and 
the policy outcomes regarding market-orientation and strategies of cost 
containment and recalibration. It can be demonstrated that the SPD repeatedly 
acted in a way that contradicted the assumed partisan preferences.  
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1 Introduction 
The healthcare system is a fundamental part of the German welfare state. More than 
99 per cent of the German population is insured within the health insurance scheme (BMG 
2013c: 113). The total healthcare expenditure amounts to more than eleven percent of GDP, 
ranking Germany among the countries with greatest expenditures within the OECD and even 
exceeding the OECD average by about two percent (OECD 2013: 156-157; Oduncu 2012: 
328).  
Many laws and reforms targeting the healthcare system were introduced by different 
governments during the last decades. The most extensive reforms aimed at making the 
financing of the healthcare system more stable and sustainable while preserving its 
functionality. In addition, a certain trend towards more competition among the health 
insurance funds is evident in several reforms. Both tendencies, the focus on financial 
sustainability, as well as on competition can be recognised easily in the official label of the 
most significant reforms in the 2000s. These reform policies are named the Act on the 
Modernisation of the Statutory Health Insurance (GKV1-Modernisierungsgesetz) from 2003, 
the Act for Strengthening Competition in the Statutory Health Insurance (GKV-
Wettbewerbstärkungsgesetz) from 2007, the Financing Act of the Statutory Health Insurance 
(GKV-Finanzierungsgesetz) from 2010 and the Act for the further Development of the 
Financial Structure and the Quality of the Statutory Health Insurance (GKV-Finanzstruktur 
und Qualitäts-Weiterentwicklungsgesetz) from 2014.  
The political goal of creating and enhancing competition within healthcare as a typical 
sector of public service raises further questions concerning the type of market and 
competition. According to Gingrich (2011), at least six ideal types of markets for public 
sector marketisation can be identified. These are classified by differentiating between 
allocation and production dimensions and emphasising either the position of the state, citizens 
(users) or producers (Gingrich 2011: 10-18).  
The time period from the early 2000s to 2014 is not only characterised by alteration 
within the healthcare scheme but also by recurring changes on the political level. Except the 
national elections in 2002, each following parliamentary election led to a change in the 
formation of the government. The Red-Green federal government formed by the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the environmental Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen) remained in office from 1998-2005. The grand coalition government of SPD and the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) persisted from 2005-2009. 
This grand coalition was succeeded by a conservative-liberal coalition formed by CDU/CSU2 
and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), which lasted until 2013. Since 2013, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 The term GKV labels the German abbreviation for Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, which is the German 
Statutory Health Insurance. 
2
 In the following, the term CDU/CSU is used in a standardised form to label the one party-union, which is 
formed by the Christian Democratic parties in Germany.      
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present government consists of CDU/CSU and SPD, and represents the second grand 
coalition in the 21st century in Germany. Overall, four different parties were involved in 
formation of government within 15 years, which indicates fluent changes in the political 
sphere.  
However, the permanent participation of either the CDU/CSU or SPD illustrates a 
continuity of the two major political partisan camps in Germany, the Social Democrats and 
Christian Democrats. Thus, both parties have great significance and responsibility for the 
design and implementation of reforms targeting the healthcare system.   
The SPD as a traditional Social Democratic party represents the political left and 
established its core constituency among the labour class (Huber et al. 1993), even though 
there have been shifts in the party’s programmatic orientation towards the new middle 
(Paterson, Sloam 2006: 235-242). The CDU/CSU is seen as a party of the political right with 
close connections to the capital class. Moreover, the Christian Democratic parties are 
considered to hold a special position among the conservative parties. They emerged from 
confessional parties, keeping a more social attitude, while also opening themselves to more 
social groups of the electorate (Kalyvas, van Kersbergen 2010: 186-191). Nevertheless, SPD 
and CDU/CSU symbolise the different ideological partisan branches of left and right in the 
following sections of this paper.  
1.1 Research question  
The classification of SPD and CDU/CSU as advocates of either labour or capital 
induces a great interest regarding the effects for the above mentioned healthcare reforms. The 
trend towards more competition in a previously regulated healthcare system needs to be 
examined considering the partisanship of the respective government. This raises the main 
research question, how do traditional power resource theory and market-oriented partisan 
preferences help us to understand the justifications of CDU/CSU and SPD for the key 
healthcare reforms in Germany between 2003 and 2014? This thesis aims to investigate how 
the two parties, SPD and CDU/CSU, justified their attitudes towards the most significant 
healthcare reform policies in Germany during the 2000s. The objective is to understand why 
the parties carried out the reform policies in their particular way. For this purpose, the 
discourse of SPD and CDU/CSU is analysed in regard to the theoretically derived 
expectations of the parties’ policy preferences. 
1.2 Motivation  
The healthcare system is of great significance for the German welfare state. It provides 
medical treatment and universal access to healthcare for the population. The political question 
about how to achieve high-quality healthcare with sustainable financing needs to be answered 
to secure the healthcare system in the future. Therefore, I have a great interest in the 
healthcare reforms of the last decade. It is also important to understand how the healthcare 
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structure changed, and who benefited and suffered from these changes. The implementation 
of cost-reduction measures and competition among health insurances through healthcare 
reforms is the chosen means to secure the financing of healthcare. The four selected 
healthcare reforms contained extensive measures targeting and reorganising the functionality 
of the interaction between health insurance funds, physicians, patients and insured persons. 
The main objective of all four reforms was to stabilise the financing and secure healthcare 
quality. A variety of other healthcare related policies were enacted between the time period 
from 2003 to 2014. Since most of these reforms only addressed minor issues such as 
pharmaceutical law, hospital reimbursement or care regularities, none of these reforms 
reached as far as the four selected healthcare reforms.  
The role of the parties, above all SPD and CDU/CSU, cannot be underestimated. Both 
parties are the only ones that provided German chancellors, and dominate politics in 
Germany. Most of the reforms contain uncomfortable measures and need support across party 
borders. Thus, it is of great importance that SPD and CDU/CSU cooperate during the 
decision-making stage. Both parties cooperated for three out of four reforms. Nevertheless, it 
needs to be examined which party pushed through its own preferences with more success and 
how both parties justified their position towards the reforms. These circumstances interested 
me about the significance of partisan preferences for actual policy outcomes. In how far can 
the SPD leave its mark on reforms that introduce markets into healthcare, or does the 
CDU/CSU take control of the reform policies? On the other hand, how strong is the impact of 
budget constraints on the politicians? And does the concept of partisanship help to understand 
why the policies were designed in their particular manner? Furthermore, it is of high interest 
whether the reform design actually matches with the expected preferences of the parties. From 
this, the general direction of future reform outcomes for each party can be inferred. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This paper is organised in six chapters. The second chapter introduces the policy 
background. The background section defines several important key terms and illustrates the 
reasons for rising healthcare costs and the financing deficit of the healthcare system. The 
section concludes by introducing possible reform options with a focus on market-related 
reform as well as different reform strategies that are used to characterise the reform policies. 
The following chapter elucidates the theoretical concepts of partisanship, power resource 
theory and market-oriented power resources. These are applied in a comprehensive manner to 
motivate and explain the policy-related preferences of the different parties. The fourth chapter 
outlines the methodology. For this purpose, the concept of discourse analysis is briefly 
explained. The following chapter includes the analysis of the political discourse regarding the 
selected healthcare reforms. This chapter provides more precise information about the reform 
policies as well as the discourse of the chosen political actors. The thesis concludes by 
analysing the expected preferences of the parties in relation to their actual statements during 
the decision-making process. 
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2 Policy background 
2.1 Terms and functionalities within the German 
healthcare system 
The German healthcare system consists of several organisations and institutions that 
have interacting relationships and are regulated by different laws and acts. In order to achieve 
a better comprehension of the healthcare reforms examined in this thesis, it is important to 
elucidate some of these relationships and to explain the role of several institutions in a brief 
overview. For this purpose, the basic meaning of several healthcare related terms is explained 
in the following. 
The Statutory Health Insurance (SHI), as the organisational entity of sickness funds, is 
the central pillar of the German healthcare system. Its purpose is an insurance against 
financial risks for individuals in case of sickness (BMG 2014a). Thus, it covers the costs for 
medical treatment and pharmaceuticals according to a predetermined and mostly standardised 
benefits catalogue. The respective SHI are organised as public corporations and under state 
supervision (BMG 2014b; Green, Irvine 2001: 53-59). The SHI is financed mainly by 
contributions from its members and to some extent from federal grants. The membership in 
the SHI is compulsory for employed people and those who exceed a certain yearly income 
threshold are also entitled to join the private health insurance (BMG 2014c; Green, Irvine 
2001: 54-55). 
The Private Health Insurance (PHI) is the general term for all non-statutory health 
insurance funds, which provide health insurance for the private market. They are organised as 
stock companies or mutual assistances and offer differently structured benefits catalogues, 
depending on individual needs and demands. The financing of the PHI is based on premiums, 
which are contributed by the insured persons. These premiums are calculated according to 
several health indicators such as sex, age, medical history and vary in their total sum. (Green, 
Irvine 2001: 61-63; Gruber, Kiesel 2010: 354; Hofman, Browne 2013: 87-88). All self-
employed, Civil Servants (Beamte) and individuals with a yearly income above a certain 
Annual Income Limit (Jahresarbeitsentgeltgrenze) can choose to stay in the SHI as voluntary 
insured persons or opt out of the SHI and instead join the PHI. Therefore, the PHI is mainly 
applied by self-employed, civil servants and employed people with a very high income 
(Green, Irvine 2001: 61-62). 
The contribution rate is the main source of revenues for the SHI. It is paid by all 
employed insured persons who are members in the SHI and their employers. Both parties 
contribute an equal share (in parity). The current contributions are used to pay for the entire 
costs of healthcare, which also characterises the German healthcare as a pay-as-you-go 
system. The particular contribution rate is calculated as a percentage of gross income, with the 
result that individuals with a higher income pay higher contributions than individuals with 
lower income in absolute amounts. However, this applies only up to a certain income ceiling 
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called the National Income Threshold (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). The National Income 
Threshold is determined by the government for each year and ensures that an income above 
the threshold level is not included into the calculation of the contribution rate (BMG 2014c; 
Green, Irvine 2001: 54-55). 
2.2 The German healthcare system before the reform 
policies 
In the following, the subject of consideration is the German healthcare system at the 
end of the 1990s. This step back in time is necessary in order to gain a profound insight in the 
healthcare scheme before the policy reforms were introduced and actually unfolded their 
effects. In this way, the changes caused by the reforms emerge in a stronger manner and can 
be analysed more clearly. The German healthcare system is based on several principles such 
as social solidarity, free choice of physicians and the principles of subsidiarity and 
corporatism, which are still active.  
The principle of social solidarity is applied to the SHI and is summarised with the 
statement: “The healthy support the sick” (BMG 2013a). The principle specifies that all 
insured persons have access to the same comprehensive medical treatment and that their 
contribution rate is not dependent on health indicators such as age, sex or health risks. In 
addition, most dependants as well as spouses in case of unemployment are covered by family 
insurance without any surcharges. Furthermore, the catalogue of benefits of the SHI grants 
full or a high level coverage of services (BMG 2013a; Burkhardt 2013).  
Although there are some minor restrictions, basically, all insured persons of the SHI 
have a free choice of physicians (BMG 2014d). The can freely choose their family physician 
and also visit each other general physician without a referral. However, it is intended that 
patients visit the same medical practise again once they choose a particular one to simplify the 
medical treatment. The patients are free to switch to different doctors.    
The principle of subsidiarity puts the responsibility for policies on the smallest 
political or societal level considering the precondition that these smallest entities have to be 
capable to carry out such policies. According to the subsidiarity in the German healthcare 
system, the federal government is not involved in all healthcare related issues. It rather 
determines the legal structure of healthcare and defines general health objectives to be 
achieved by the other actors within the healthcare system. These different actors are supposed 
to follow the principle of self-administration. 
The principle of corporatism is, on one hand, given through the representation of 
certain stakeholders of employers and employees at governing board level of the health 
insurances. On the other hand, there is a corporatist process of participation and bargaining 
between healthcare providers such as physician, hospitals, dentists, the pharmaceutical 
industry and the health insurance funds. Thus, all actors are involved in the decision-making 
process on the definition of healthcare (Green, Irvine 2001: 53; Giaimo, Manow 1999: 976-
78; Busse, Riesberg 2004: 42-45).   
In general, the German healthcare system clearly represents the Bismarckian model. 
This model is mainly characterised by a healthcare insurance system, which is compulsory 
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and generates its revenues from income-related contributions from the insured persons. 
Inasmuch, the state is responsible for defining general health objectives and maintaining 
certain regulations for the involved actors, even though it does not finance the healthcare 
scheme (Giamo 2001: 350-351; Steffen 2010: 142; Busse, Riesberg 2004: 23-25). 
The SHI was founded in the late 19th Century by employees “and in some cases by 
employers as mutual aid societies” (Green, Irvine 2001: 54) and still plays a key role in the 
healthcare system. All individuals are free to choose an insurance fund within the scope of the 
SHI. It covers the health insurance for unemployed persons, students, apprentices, pensioners 
and naturally employed individuals. More than 87 per cent of the German population is 
insured in the SHI (GBE-Bund 2015). With the commencement of insurable employment, the 
employer subscribes the employees as members of the health funds. The members can switch 
to any other health insurance once a year in accordance to a national established deadline. 
Insured persons use a personal registered electronic card each time they visit a doctor or 
hospital. With this practice, instead of individuals directly paying, health funds pay for 
medical treatments. In turn, insured persons and their employers make their parity 
contribution from the monthly gross income of the insured persons and according to the 
contribution rate of the health fund. Within, employees and employers are responsible for 
about 60 per cent of the total healthcare system’s funding. However, there are additional 
resources that are used to finance the healthcare system. Thus, the state co-finances the 
system with about 21 per cent from its own budget in order to close financial gaps. Besides, 
the share of private financing occurring through the PHI aggregates to seven per cent, while 
patient payments amount to about eleven per cent (Green, Irvine 2001: 54-57). 
2.3 Rising costs and non-sustainable financing 
Healthcare is an expensive good that needs to be financed in a stable and sustainable 
way in order to keep the healthcare system functional and working. Although the financing of 
the German healthcare system has a very clear structure, it struggles with sharply increasing 
costs and decreasing revenues from the contribution rate. Since 1970 the total healthcare costs 
as a percentage of GDP raised from 6.0 per cent in 1970 to 8.4 per cent in 1980. The share 
kept stable until 1990 with about 8.3 per cent and increased again up to 10.5 per cent in 2001 
(OECD 2014). This data on its own in not meaningful since it does not allow any inference 
about the evolution of actual costs of healthcare in Germany. Therefore, it needs to be 
supported by further data. For this purpose, two more indicators, namely total healthcare 
expenditures and expenditures per capita are examined. During the same time period as 
above, the German healthcare expenditures per capita rose eight-fold from approximately 340 
Euro per capita in 1970 to about 2.570 Euro per capita in 2001. This significant rise of costs 
per capita is even exceeded by the increase of total healthcare expenditure, which tripled from 
20.6 billion Euro in 1970 to more than 63 billion Euro in 1980 and kept increasing to more 
than 104.9 billion Euro in 1990 and doubled again to above 211.8 billion Euro in 2001 
(OECD 2014). Within, there was a ten-fold increase of total healthcare expenditures in 30 
years. Accordingly, the German healthcare system is classified as one of the most cost-
intensive systems in Europe during the late 1990s while only being surpassed by Switzerland 
(European Observatory on Health Care Systems 2000: 51-55). 
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What are the reasons for this sharp rise of costs in the German healthcare system? 
They can be found in several factors and processes. The technological progress in different 
fields of medicine and new medical devices or treatments is often accompanied with costly 
research or developments. Thus, technological growth is one factor for an increase in 
healthcare costs (Chandra et al. 2012: 647-650; BMG 2013b). Furthermore, the demographic 
change and subsequently the aging population contribute in part to the rising costs. Elderly 
people are expected to make use of the healthcare services more often than younger 
individuals. As a side effect, pensioners have a smaller pension income than during their work 
life; accordingly, their total sum of contributions decreases by a significant amount once they 
retire. Therefore, the growing group of elderly people results in a reduction of total 
contributions to the SHI (BMG 2013b). 
Another important process can be identified in the economic systems. After the oil-
crisis in the 1970s, many countries including Germany, experienced economic problems 
followed by periods of austerity. The growing unemployment rate in Germany can be seen as 
one consequence of this process. Again, a growing share of unemployment among the 
population leads to decreasing funds for the health insurances. Thus, the number of 
contributing individuals diminishes while the actual number of insured persons stays the 
same. In addition, the emerging number of marginal or part time jobs might have a similar 
effect. The income of such employment relationships performs at a low level. Inasmuch, the 
sum of contributions to the SHI is lower, either. Furthermore, the unification process of the 
two German states during 1990-1991 caused new costs for the German healthcare system. 
The western German model of the SHI had to integrate a great number of additional 
individuals into the current system as well as the different structures of healthcare institutions 
in the former eastern Germany. Moreover, the share of labour related wages of the total 
economies’ income diminished in comparison to capital-related income (Schmidt et al. 2010: 
469; Busse, Riesberg 2004: 59-60). In case of a healthcare system which is based on the SHI 
and income-related contributions, this changing ratio leads to a negative trend in revenues 
even though the general economy might still grow. 
Within steadily increasing healthcare costs and constantly decreasing revenues from 
income-related contributions, the SHI runs the risk to operate with a financial deficit. In order 
to compensate this financial pressure, the health insurances were forced to constantly increase 
their revenues. Thus, the average contribution rate rose from 8.2 per cent in 1970 to 11.37 per 
cent in 1980 and continued to increase to 12.53 per cent in 1990, reaching 13.56 per cent in 
2001 (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg 2015; Green, Irvine 2001: 55). 
Since the SHI contribution rate belongs to the package of additional non-wage labour 
costs, its rising level has a strong impact on the German economy. On the employers’ side 
increasing non-wage labour costs simply make labour more expensive. Employers have to 
spend a higher amount of resources for contributions to the social insurance system of each of 
their employees. Thus, companies are considered to hesitate in employing more or new 
workers. Furthermore, the employers and management boards argue that such high non-wage 
labour costs weaken the competitiveness of German enterprises and within the position of 
German companies in the international market. Both tendencies are expected to create an 
economic downward trend and therefore foster increasing unemployment, which in turn 
works against the stability of SHI finances (Giaimo, Manow 1999: 976-977; Carrera et al. 
2008: 980-981). The rising level of the contribution rate can result in a loss of purchase power 
on the employees’ side, if there is no wage increase to outweigh the additional burden. A 
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lower purchase power is supposed to lead to less consumption-related stimulation for the 
economy. Accordingly, such processes counteract economic growth, which is assumed to 
foster unemployment and decrease SHI revenues (Carrera et al. 2008: 980-981). 
Due to the variety of intense side effects, the option of a dynamic adjusting 
contribution rate is not considered adequately. The presented arguments against a permanent 
increase of the contribution rate, as a natural reaction to higher costs and lower revenues, 
creates a condition in which the scope of action for both, the SHI and politicians, is quite 
limited. However, the most likely way of approaching the issue is to implement healthcare 
reform policies that tackle the dilemma characterising healthcare financing in Germany. 
2.4 Reform options for healthcare systems 
2.4.1 Market-Oriented Reforms 
Healthcare reform policies can have very different concepts especially in their design 
and content. A very important branch of reforms is represented by market-oriented reforms 
aiming at public service domains. According to Gingrich (2011:7), newly created markets can 
differ a lot and approach the spheres of “spending, cost sharing, benefits or coverage” in 
diverse ways. Market-oriented reforms often seek to enhance competition and efficiency 
within the targeted system, by changing the relationship of costs and power among involved 
actors, such as the state, users of services and the mostly new private producers of services. 
Six models of markets are differentiated in a more detailed way by emphasising which of the 
actors achieves more control (production dimension) and on the other side by scrutinising 
whether access (allocation dimension) to the market is guaranteed on a collective or 
individual level (ibid: 3-12). 
The category of State-Driven Markets is used for introduced markets in which the 
state keeps the main control about the targeted domain. In this way, the state puts itself in a 
market overseeing and determining position. The market is primarily seen a tool to increase 
efficiency, especially cost efficiency. The two models of Austerity Markets and Managed 
Markets can be identified within the state-driven markets. The latter does not create 
opportunities for less efficient producers to pass on the costs to the service users and are thus 
protecting the users from new costs. Furthermore, managed markets seek to keep a broad and 
collective access to the service. Austerity Markets involve more stimuli for the service users 
to request fewer services. This is achieved through privatisation of services, causing a 
considerable higher level of costs for the individuals or breaking up of access regulations 
(Gingrich 2011: 12-14). 
The second category of Consumer-Driven Markets comprises markets, whose 
implementation emphasises the consumers’ choice of service producers and thus creates more 
incentives for service innovation and improvement. Such markets grant the consumers with 
free choice of producers or the option to opt out of the system. The funds for the producers 
are allocated depending on the decisions of the users. Therefore, the service producers are 
forced to comply with the consumers’ priorities for higher service quality which is expected 
to motivate the producers to compete with each other more. Consumer-Controlled Markets 
and Two-Tiered Markets are the two representative models of Consumer-Driven markets. The 
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former are characterised by an urge to avoid putting more costs onto the service users in order 
to empower users in weaker positions to make decisions. For this purpose, Consumer-
Controlled Markets rely on strong collective public funding of services and pursue to 
distribute the gains among all consumers. In contrast, by allowing the producers to pass on 
more costs to the service users, the two tiered markets advantage specific factions of the 
consumers which are often among low risk, low cost or high income groups of individuals. 
Furthermore, two tiered markets practice individual cost sharing thus enhancing the individual 
financial responsibility of the consumers (ibid: 15-16). 
In the third category, Producer-Driven Markets transfer a great share of market-
control in the hands of service producers in order to enable innovation; at the same time 
reducing the power of users as well as the state. The service producers aim to bring in as 
many users as possible without having a strong competition for a high quality performance. 
Those markets emerge out of situations when processes of expanding users’ choice or 
contracting have a lack of clearly set rules or regulations as well as when new service 
producers can come onto the market and the public inspection performs only at a low level. 
Thus, new producers have a strong position in the market. Both Pork Barrel Markets and 
Private Power Markets are possible models of Producer-Driven Markets. Pork Barrel Markets 
are characterised by a distinctive collective financing, putting a few service producers in a 
very profitable market position. The Private Power Markets allow producers to pass a greater 
share of costs onto the consumers, making the service more expensive for users while 
reducing the costs for the state (Gingrich 2011: 17-18). 
In order to grasp the variety of possible healthcare system reforms beside just the six 
theoretical archetypes of market oriented reforms, it is necessary to take a look at different 
kinds of reforms in different countries during recent reform periods. In the early 1990s several 
countries introduced reforms aiming at more competition and trying to separate the healthcare 
market in order to open it up for private actors. The United Kingdom’s healthcare reforms 
aimed at enhancing competition as well as market forces. They broke up the previous 
structure of healthcare service delivery by separating service deliverers and purchasers. In the 
Netherlands several reforms made efforts to increase efficiency and innovation by 
strengthening competition among both profit-seeking and non-profit private insurance funds. 
The insured persons became enabled to choose particular insurance funds, overturning the 
previous practice of regional dependent distribution of insured persons to insurance funds. In 
Sweden the government commenced healthcare policies to encourage users’ choice and 
private physicians’ activity. The individuals in Sweden were allowed to choose the competent 
physician freely, while the emergence of private medical practices was facilitated by the 
politicians and government (Schmid et al. 2010: 460-467; Toth 2010: 82-84). 
In contrast to such reforms which ensure competition and more market forces, many 
reform policies intend to create more regulation and integration within the healthcare system. 
This can be achieved through inclusion of new or already existing agencies within the 
healthcare sector, a greater integration of different involved actors forcing them to cooperate 
more closely or a reduction of the patients’ choices. France introduced several policies in the 
late 1990s to increase integration as well as regulation. General practitioners were empowered 
to act as gatekeepers in order to prevent patients approaching specialists without a referral. 
Agencies on both regional and national level were formed to control and plan the healthcare 
system. A similar process took place in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s. The Blair 
Labour government introduced several policies targeting more co-operation and collaboration 
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rather than competition. The new primary care trusts initiated the cooperation between 
primary care providers, public authorities and hospitals (Klein 1998: 114-116; Toth 2010: 84-
86). 
2.4.2 Examining strategies for cost containment or recalibration 
This paper examines the major healthcare reforms in Germany during the 2000s. For 
this purpose, the reforms are classified considering two broad dimensions of cost containment 
and recalibration. The underlying logic of this distinction is that both concepts represent 
different ways to achieve a stabilisation of the healthcare financing, although they are usually 
applied in a complementary way (Pierson 2001: 419-429). The two strategies can be 
identified as direct or indirect outcomes of the service marketisation which is conducted by 
the reforms.   
Cost containment comprises different strategies for decreasing the costs of the 
healthcare system in a sustainable manner. Such strategies are identified within the areas of 
the financing structure, competition and simple cuts of benefits. All kind of outsourcing, or 
cuts of the SHI’s catalogue of benefits, is supposed to reduce the expenditures of SHI and 
decrease the costs of the healthcare system. The competition among health insurances is 
expected to force SHI to achieve their performance in a more cost-efficient way, which 
contains their administrative expenditures. Those who are insured, as users of healthcare, also 
need incentives and opportunities for choosing to switch to more efficiently performing SHI. 
This way increasing competition is also assumed to decrease the costs of healthcare provision. 
Finally, changes of the financing structure are applied to make the resource distribution more 
balanced and efficient, considering the very different socio-economic composition of SHI 
members. Furthermore, only changes of the financing structure can achieve a decoupling of 
healthcare costs from non-wage labour costs. Overall, such changes are supposed to create 
more incentives for healthcare actors, in particular users and health insurances, to act in more 
resource saving ways. 
The recalibration dimension covers initiatives to rationalise or update current 
procedures or functionalities in order to adjust to “new social needs and demands” 
(Häusermann 2010: 27). In regards of healthcare reform policies recalibration is applied to 
integrate new technology or highly demanded treatments into the SHI’s catalogue of benefits 
or to react to recent developments. The integration of recently developed or demanded 
treatments, such as medical screenings or vaccinations, is necessary for achieving the quality 
goals of healthcare, while responding to newly articulated needs of the users. Recalibration 
can also be applied to counteract or steer against undesired trends of inefficiency or even 
abuse of the healthcare system. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
This chapter applies the theoretical concept of partisanship to deduce the traditional 
power resources as well as the market-oriented power resources approach to explain and to 
frame my expectations regarding the preferences of CDU/CSU and SPD.  
3.1 Concept of partisanship 
The concept of partisanship or partisan politics in welfare state studies refers to parties 
and their significance for the modern political system of party democracy. It aims to explain 
why parties behave how they do and for this purpose recognises parties “as representatives of 
social constituencies mostly defined in terms of industrial classes and as bearers of clear 
ideological stances for liberal, social-democratic or conservative welfare policies” 
(Häusermann et. al 2013: 221). The concept of partisanship was substantial influenced and 
elaborated in the early 1970s by several authors. The analytical study of Hibbs (1977) stated 
that left-wing parties show a strong tendency towards more redistributional policies and 
would rather accept higher inflation than growing unemployment. According to Hibbs (1977) 
this trend can be explained with the different policy preferences of particular social classes, 
which are generally closely linked to the constituencies of left- or right-wing parties. Borg 
and Castles (1981) claimed analogous statements about the relevance of right-wing parties for 
“explaining public policy outcomes” (Borg, Castles 1981: 620). Thus, partisanship refers to 
both sides of the political spectrum, the left and the right.  
Parties and their core electorate, their partisans, share mutual interests in societal, 
economic or political questions. Such “normative commitments” (White, Ypi 2011: 382) 
between parties and citizens are promoted through active engagement of individuals. 
Furthermore, these partisans pursue to bring their mutual issues and objectives to the public 
agenda, in order to have a better chance of being considered during the process of collective 
decision-making. The term partisanship emphasises these procedures and practices in contrast 
to the rather representative and administrative form of a party. Then again the close bond 
between partisans and parties, also distinguishes partisans from other individuals such as 
intellectuals, social or political activists or scientific experts who strive to influence policies, 
often without taking position for a particular political party (White, Ypi 2011: 382-383).  
Schmidt names “political parties as multi-goal organisations” (Schmidt 1996: 156). 
They are office-seeking and policy-striving. While parties matter for politics, there is also a 
strong linkage between the electorate and parties, giving a great importance to the 
constituency and its political preferences. Thus, when parties are in position to participate or 
lead the political process of policy-making, they seek to meet the common goals they share 
with their core electorate in regard to societal, economic or political questions (Häusermann 
et. al 2013: 224-225, Schmidt 1996: 156).  
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Some critique on the concept of partisanship is established, considering the challenges 
parties are facing, in Western democracies, during the last three decades. Mair formulates “the 
failings of parties” (Mair 2005: 8) and demonstrates that parties are particularly affected by 
popular withdrawal, the withdrawal of elites and a decrease of programmatic alternatives. 
Popular withdrawal summarises all the effects of a declining electoral participation, the 
emergence and rise of electoral instability and high voter volatility, a decline of partisan 
attachment and a loss of party member or activists (Mair 2005: 8-16). While the diminishing 
programmatic alternatives, produce party programmes that are very similar in content and 
almost interchangeable, within originally different parties, the withdrawal of elites leads to a 
“mutual disengagement of citizens from political parties and of party elites from parties” 
(Bader 2014: 356). In addition, parties struggle with two more challenges that have the 
potential to undermine their significance. First, the emergence of possible new social 
cleavages such as gender or ethno-religious issues open up political space for different or 
even new social and political movements. This process puts the already existing parties under 
pressure of how to react and position themselves. Second, the progressive integration into 
transnational institutions, such as the European Union, holds the potential to shift the focus of 
parties from national to international politics. The parties can benefit from this process but 
also run the risk of spending too many resources on either of the two spheres, while 
neglecting the other one (Bader, Bonotti 2014: 253-254).  
Another critical approach on the significant role of parties and partisanship can be 
seen in the debate around the “New Politics of the Welfare State” (Pierson 2001), which 
assigns a great responsibility for the weakening of partisan politics to the concept of path 
dependency. The expansion of the welfare state did not only change social policies but also 
beliefs and preferences of the electorate, thereby founding new groups within the 
constituency. The emergence of these groups demonstrates “how policy feedback from 
previous political choices can influence contemporary political struggles” (Pierson 1996: 
151). This change is assumed to reduce the influence of simple partisan politics for policy 
outcomes, making parties and partisanship less important than partisanship theory suggests.  
Furthermore, there are three additional perspectives on partisan politics that can be 
seen as a critique on the traditional partisanship theory. The first approach argues that the 
electoral constituency, in particular of left and social-democratic parties, changed during the 
last decades. On the one side, many predominantly young and well educated middle-class 
individuals from the heterogeneous group of “sociocultural professionals” (Kriesi 1998: 169) 
turned to the parties of the political left, forming the constituency of the new left. However 
many of these voters are assumed to experience different social risks preferences, than the 
previously typical electorate of the left parties. This trend of attracting new voters to left-wing 
and social-democratic parties puts the parties into the position that they first have to discover, 
and then deal with new political issues, in order to keep the support of the gained voters 
(Häusermann et al. 2013: 228). On the other side, many individuals from the working class 
gave up their support for political left parties and are progressively attracted by right-wing 
populist parties. This tendency goes hand in hand with the insider-outsider theory, which 
distinguishes between the employed as relatively well protected insiders and the unemployed 
or low-protected low-wage outsiders. The described discrepancy within the working class 
leads to different interests of both groups (Rueda 2005: 61-62). In a similar way as with the 
group of the new left, the parties of the political left struggle deciding who to support - the 
insiders or outsiders. However, the group of insiders, as representatives of the middle, 
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promise a more stable and rewarding electorate support. Therefore the left parties change and 
adjust their political agenda to the new electorate group.  
The second argument emphasises that parties deal with different political situations 
and systems. Governments dominated by the political left, are more likely to establish within 
electoral systems of proportional representation, than majority representation. Hence it 
matters what kind of institutions or welfare structures a party encounters. In addition, the 
position of the social-democratic party in the party system itself can have great significance 
for its partisan perception. This position is determined by whether there are other left, 
religious (such as Christian democratic) or agrarian parties. All of these parties can cover 
political issues of the social-democratic party, which has to adjust its political agenda in order 
to compete for voters (Häusermann et al. 2013: 229-231). 
The third approach claims that the party-voter linkage is not only characterised by an 
ideological link, alongside the social cleavages. Instead it assumes that voters select a certain 
party due to either programmatic or clientelistic reasons. The client links the vote for a party 
to the prospect of “direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” 
(Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007: 2). While programmatic voters support a party for the sake of 
policies it proclaims on its agenda. Depending on the composition of the electorate and the 
level of the state’s bureaucracy, parties can be forced to adopt policies to fulfil clientelistic 
demands for specific groups, even if they originally sought to implement more universal 
social policies (Häusermann et al. 2013: 232-234).  
Rosenblum (2000, 2008) contributed a profound work to current political theory 
discussions, countering antipartyism, as well as critique on the partisanship theory, by arguing 
for the still important role of parties and partisanship within the political arena. Parties are 
relevant actors for the political work in modern democratic states and have a major role 
regarding managing “conflicts, nonviolent succession of governments, checking and 
exposing, competent governing” (Rosenblum 2008: 136). Thus, Rosenblum identifies 
“regulated rivalry”, “governing” and “ethics of partisanship” (ibid: 156) as the three moments 
of appreciation - an appreciation of parties and partisanship. This leads to a position of 
“viewing parties as not only occasionally necessary but ordinarily acceptable, useful, even 
morally desirable features of political life” (ibid. 119). According to Rosenblum parties do 
still matter and are capable of contributing useful political output in democracies. White and 
Ypi (2010) developed this approach by identifying a normative, motivational and executive 
source, being relevant for the political agency. These sources refer to the basic political 
action, participation and will formation of citizens, their ambition to recognise the political 
ideals as mutual accomplishments worth to be strived for and the perception of political 
agency as an institution to protect the political ideals (ibid. 809-813). White and Ypi 
conclude, that “parties are not only well suited to cultivate these sources of conviction 
regarding the worth of political agency, but that they respond to the normative, motivational 
and executive demands in ways that no other type of actor can match” (ibid. 813).  
While partisanship can be also recognised as the identification of the electorate with 
political parties, there are at least two main approaches explaining this kind of identification. 
The first one emphasises the identity that people identify with in social and political terms. 
This classification can lead to a distinct group, which accept important group behaviour and 
rules, while seeing themselves as members of this group. Parties or partisan organisations, 
among other things, can be connected with a group identity. The second approach focuses on 
an individual’s mind-set towards a particular party. Diverse attitudes towards all kind of 
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matters can be caused and influenced by various social, economic and political aspects such 
as ideology, experiences or socioeconomic background. Such attitudes connected to a party 
are seen as very strong and powerful thus preserving the individual’s identification with the 
party. Both the identity and attitude related approaches can be seen as taking effect at the 
same time rather than excluding each other (Bartle, 2009: 3-13). 
3.2 Traditional Power Resource Theory 
In a similar way as the concept of partisanship and partisan politics focus on parties as 
important actors of political agency, the power resource theory also highlights the 
significance of parties for particular policy outcomes. It is a theoretical approach that intends 
to analyse and explain “variation in the size and coverage of welfare states” (Rothstein et al. 
2012: 2) and it is mostly applied to examine different developments within the welfare states 
of the western capitalist world. The traditional power resource theory argues there is a clear 
relationship between a well organised working class, leading to a high level of political 
representation through trade unions on the one side, and strong welfare states with a more 
redistributive character on the other side (Iversen, Stephens 2008: 4; Pontusson, Hyeok Yong 
2006: 1-7). 
Walter Korpi and John Stephens participated essentially with their work (Korpi 1980, 
1983, 1985; Stephens 1979) to develop and complement (Korpi 2006; Huber, Stephens 2001) 
the theoretical approach of power resources. The power resources itself are perceived “as the 
attributes (capacities or means) of actors (individuals or collectives […]), which enable them 
to reward or to punish other actors” (Korpi 1985: 33). These actors are interlinked with each 
other and their number within a power domain can vary. However, the usage of power 
resources is connected to costs due to its mobilization and application. Typical power 
resources within capitalist democracies are identified as capital in the form of funds, control 
over the means of production and human capital connected to labour, occupational skills and 
education. These power resources can be linked to the socio-economic class structures of 
capital and labour, assigning control over means of production respectively monetary funds to 
the capital class and the ability to organise the human capital into a unified, collective action 
to the labour class (Korpi 1980: 298, 1985: 33-34).  
According to Korpi (1980), the study of different levels of social inequality, as well as 
equality within western capitalist democracies, is one of the core tasks of welfare studies and 
makes an analysis of distributive processes in these countries necessary. For this purpose and 
to explore the interdependencies and mechanisms, the analysis requires a strong focus on the 
distribution of power resources. In contrast to various previous researches, Korpi assumes that 
the allocation of the power resources is not stable, uneven or dichotomous but rather varying 
over time and different countries (Korpi 1980: 297-298). Thus, the control over power 
resources is identified “to be of central importance for inequality” (Korpi 1980: 298). 
The power resource theory is based on the idea that individuals from the working 
class, such as wage earners and their dependents, are supposed to have an interest in stronger 
welfare states. This interest is caused by these individuals being more affected by social risks 
such as unemployment, sickness or parenthood. Therefore they seek a high level of social 
protection. Furthermore, the different social classes can have diverse class-based norms and 
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interests and the working class is recognised as having a self-interest in redistribution of 
wealth through the state (Esping-Andersen 1990; Rothstein et al. 2012: 3-4). The trade unions 
and social-democratic parties are seen as the natural socio-political partners to address these 
interests. Thus, trade unions and social-democratic left-wing parties are the two main groups 
of social and political associations, which can activate and use the power resources of the 
labour class. Therefore both voter turnouts in elections for social-democratic parties, as well 
as the level of unionisation among the working class, are recognised as the key features for 
measuring the power distribution to the labour class. While the impact of trade unions was 
valued more at the early stage of the theory developing, the role of left-wing parties for 
mobilizing the labour class in the political sphere received great advocacy in later debates 
(Korpi, Palme 2003: 427-428; Huber, Stephens 2000). Therefore the share of vote for left-
wing parties is seen as the most significant indicator and “displaced trade unions as the 
primary agents of working-class mobilization” (Pontusson, Hyeok Yong 2006: 5).  
Although the traditional power resources approach emphasises the significance of the 
Social Democratic parties, it is important to mention that Christian Democratic parties also 
take part in the considerations about welfare state expansion. Recent studies concluded that 
Christian Democratic parties do not necessarily cut the welfare state but organise the public 
spending in a different way than their Social Democratic counterpart. The Christian 
Democrats aim at transfer-oriented welfare policies, which favour families rather than 
individuals and enhance social fragmentation. Thus, the social structure is maintained rather 
than refreshed (Allan, Scruggs: 2004: 505-509; Kalyvas, van Kersbergen 2010: 196-198).  
The power resources approach for explaining the differently shaped welfare states in 
the western capitalist world has been challenged and criticized from various positions and 
perspectives. Mares (2003) argues that companies and employers can have similar preferences 
to workers or unions, regarding skill protecting social insurances.  
The variety of capitalism approach (Hall, Soskice 2001) also highlights the 
significance of for the distribution of income and employment. It states that diverse corporate 
behaviour creates opportunities for different strategies of social policies, thus being an 
important factor for the emergence of differently shaped welfare states (Hall, Soskice 2001: 6-
17; Soskice 1999: 104-114).  
The quality of government approach is complementing to the power resources theory 
(Rothstein et al. 2012: 11). It claims that the actual support for social policies aiming for 
redistribution or insurance of social risks, is highly dependent on several indicators, 
characterising the quality of government.  
3.3 Market-Oriented Power Resources  
The basic idea of the power resources theory is revived by Gingrich (2011), who 
applies the concept of constrained partisanship for explaining the emergence of public service 
markets in welfare states. This concept claims that markets in public services vary in the 
systematical dimensions of service allocation and production. These markets can give control 
to either the state, users or producers and expose or protect individuals from financial risks (as 
illustrated in chapter 2.4). The different structures of markets have a great impact on their 
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distributional character. Thus, the introduction of markets into public services does not 
automatically advantage individuals with higher incomes over groups of lower-income.  
According to Gingrich (2011) this variation in achieved redistribution, enables the left 
parties to strive for the introduction of markets in the first place. Furthermore, parties of the 
political left and right have different preferences regarding the introduction of public service 
markets. On the one side, left parties are supposed to seek for markets that aim to secure the 
financial sustainability of the welfare state, through collective financing, while integrating 
lower and higher income individuals. This way, all individuals contribute to the financing 
according to their capabilities but are granted with the same access to the service.  
On the other side, the right parties are assumed to support markets that restrict public 
services and enhance individual responsibility, thus intensifying the fragmentation between 
lower and higher income individuals. In this case the financing structure emphasises the 
individual level thus offering better access for individuals with more resources. These 
preferences also match with the originally claimed positions of left and right parties towards 
the scope of the welfare state (Gingrich 2011: 35-42). Following this argumentation, both the 
parties of the left and the right will introduce market-oriented reforms, but pulling in very 
different directions. 
3.4 Policy Preferences of CDU/CSU and SPD 
Following the power resources argument, the influence on political decisions and even 
more the participation in governments by social-democratic left-wing parties, is a requirement 
for welfare state expansion. In contrast, more liberal parties and parties of the political right as 
well as stakeholders of employers are recognised as opponents of welfare state expansion, if 
not natural supporters of welfare state cutting (Korpi 1980: 306-309). This conclusion has 
great significance for the expected policy outcomes of healthcare reforms in Germany. The 
healthcare system is facing serious issues concerning its financing. The simple increase of the 
healthcare system’s revenues, through raising the contribution rate, is considered as a very 
last option, due to its expected negative outcomes for the programmatic goal of 
unemployment reduction. Thus, the political actors are confronted with budget constraints 
driving their willingness to conduct reforms. The market-oriented approach of power 
resources revives such budget constraints as a situation, in which not only right but also left 
parties seek for the introduction of markets in public services. The next two sections 
determine the market models regarding the parties’ preferences.  
3.4.1 Theorising the Policy Preferences of the SPD 
In coherence with the traditional power resources argument, a government headed by 
the SPD, as a representative of the political left, can be expected to strive for only a low level 
of retrenchment and cutting of the benefits’ catalogue within the healthcare system. The party 
is also supposed to follow simple vote-seeking preferences, motivated by the assumption that 
the users of healthcare also represent a great part of the party’s core electorate (Pierson 2001: 
412-413). Thus, it can be assumed, that a Social-Democratic government aims to reduce the 
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costs of the healthcare system, without putting any new financial burden on these users. The 
cost reduction can be achieved by making the entire healthcare system more cost-efficient, 
through market-oriented reforms, which strengthen competitive elements among main actors 
of the healthcare scheme - the health insurances.  
Regarding the introduction of market-oriented reforms, it can be supposed that the 
political left parties seek to design and implement markets, in which the state or the users 
acquire a high level of control. This is the case in particular for Managed and Consumer-
Controlled Markets. The left wants to prevent a stronger differentiation among citizens, in 
terms of access to public services. Therefore the left aims for universal and uniformly 
maintained services, while avoiding measures of individualised allocation of services. Since 
Producer-Driven Markets in particular reduce the control of the state and expose users to risks 
of market processes, it is assumed that such market models can hardly be found on the agenda 
of a left government (Gingrich 2011: 37-44). 
How do the expected preferences of the SPD look regarding the identified reform 
strategies of cost containment and recalibration? Due to the budget constraints, the SPD is 
expected to support cost containment reform measures but not without restrictions. Cuts of 
benefits are assumed being barely desired by the SPD (see above). However, the outsourcing 
of services from the SHI’s catalogue to the budget of other institutions, such as the state itself, 
can be a way to avoid unpopular cuts, while relieving the budget of SHI.  
The party can be expected to support the introduction of competition as a necessary 
core element of a market orientated reform. According to the market preferences of the left 
(see above) the design of competition is of great importance. Therefore the Social Democrats 
are expected to favour a market constellation in which users of healthcare, instead of other 
actors like health insurances, keep the control and are granted with more choice. In addition, 
the SPD is assumed to aim to prevent and reduce the fragmentation within the market. Hence 
the party is supposed to oppose regulations that amplify the competition between SHI and 
PHI and allow more individuals with higher income to opt out from SHI to PHI. Considering 
these presumptions, the SPD is expected to prefer competition among the SHI to encourage 
and reward more cost-reducing performance and refuse competition between SHI and PHI or 
even among the insured persons, the users.  
The SPD is expected to endorse changes of the financing structure of healthcare as 
long as these changes do not put extra costs on the users and in particular on insured persons 
in weaker economic positions. The Social Democrats are supposed to support changes that 
strengthen the redistributional character of the healthcare insurance. In addition the party is 
assumed to strive for maintaining the collective financing of healthcare, which is reflected in 
income-related contribution rates and the involvement of employers and employees in equal 
terms.  
The SPD is expected to be open for the recalibration of current procedures within the 
healthcare system. The quality of healthcare can benefit significantly by implementing new 
treatments and providing more prophylactic measures for the insured persons. It is also 
expected that the party would welcome steering against unwanted tendencies, such as abuse 
of medical services. Again, it can be assumed that it is important not to put the greater part of 
additional costs onto the users of healthcare. 
According to the party’s preferences, I expect the SPD to legitimise its general support 
for market oriented reforms and cost containment strategies with the financial constraint of 
the healthcare system. The stabilising of the finances is the main argument the party can 
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utilise for justifying measures that could be disapproved by the party’s core electorate. In 
contrast, whenever the SPD can match its preferences with a reform, I expect the party to 
emphasise that the values of social justice and solidarity are achieved. This goes hand in hand 
with the collective financing of healthcare by equal contribution rates for employers and 
employees. The SPD is assumed to highlight redistributional effects and financial relief of the 
insured persons as a success while appreciating higher burdens on other actors such as the 
health insurances.  
3.4.2 Theorising the Policy Preferences of the CDU/CSU 
The reform policy preferences of a government dominated by the CDU/CSU, as a 
party of the political right, are expected to be different to those of the SPD. According to the 
power resources theory, the party is supposed to advocate benefit cuts and welfare 
retrenchment in general, much more than its political counterparts. However, the German 
healthcare system is characterised by a very high number of individuals being insured within 
the SHI (GBE-Bund 2015), which also includes a great potential constituency of CDU/CSU. 
Thus, it is expected that a government headed by CDU/CSU hesitates to introduce purely 
benefit-cutting reform policies, but rather a package of weakened retrenchment acts, in 
combination with other measures to reduce the costs of the healthcare system. Similar to the 
SPD, CDU/CSU is assumed to disapprove of an increase of the contribution rate for 
generating higher revenues. The party has a close bond to employers and their associations. 
Therefore, the party agrees that higher non-wage labour-costs are harmful for economic 
prosperity thus being not conducive for a reduction of unemployment. Hence it can be 
expected that CDU/CSU also strives for reforms aimed at cost-reduction, through the 
implementation of more market mechanisms. The preferences of CDU/CSU regarding 
market-oriented reforms are assumed to be favouring markets, emphasising the individual 
access under control of either the state, the users or private producers. This is the case for 
Austerity Markets, Two-Tiered Markets or Private Power Markets. Pork-Barrel Markets can 
be an opportunity when there is less budget pressure. The parties of the political right favour 
such markets, in order to enhance a differentiation among the users of the markets and to 
minimise the expenditures of the state within public services (Gingrich 2011: 12-18).  
Several statements regarding CDU/CSU’s attitude towards cost containment and 
recalibration strategies can be made based on those presumptions of the party’s preferences 
towards healthcare reforms. The CDU/CSU, as a party of the political right, is expected to 
aim to reduce the costs of healthcare and public expenditures for the healthcare system. 
Therefore, the party appreciates cuts of benefits in a stronger way than the SPD and is further 
willing to put more costs on the individual users. However, the universal character of 
healthcare provision and its quality, is expected to remain unchanged by the party, due to the 
great significance of healthcare for the electorate. 
The Christian Democrats are supposed to foster the fragmentation regarding the 
benefit structure of healthcare (see above). Therefore, the party strives for reform policies that 
introduce or enhance competition among the health insurances. Furthermore, the possibility 
for higher income individuals to opt out from SHI to PHI is a significant element of a 
consumer driven Two-Tiered Market situation. Thus, it can be assumed that CDU/CSU 
supports competition among the different SHI and in particular between SHI and PHI. Such a 
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competition is supposed to grant more choices to the users and facilitate switching between 
SHI and PHI.  
The CDU/CSU is expected to endorse a change of the financing structure considering 
several assumptions. On the one hand, the party is less hesitant to introduce a reform that puts 
more costs onto users and implements individual elements of financing. On the other hand, 
CDU/CSU aims to decouple healthcare costs from non-wage labour costs, to relieve the 
employers in case of rising contribution rates.  
The Christian Democrats strive for lower healthcare costs. Thus, the party is supposed 
to advocate recalibration within the healthcare system, in order to improve current procedures, 
which can be inefficient and cost-intensive. In addition, the implementation of new or 
preventive medical treatments is an important element for securing healthcare quality. 
However, CDU/CSU is expected to aim at assigning more responsibility to the users and 
again put greater parts of additional costs onto users of healthcare.  
According to CDU/CSU’s preferences, I expect the party to emphasise the need for 
reforms due to budget constraints of the healthcare system. When the preferences are met by 
the reform, the party is assumed to connect its objective of a low contribution rate to the 
programmatic goal of less unemployment. For this purpose, the party is supposed to endorse 
financial relief for the employers for decreasing the non-wage labour costs thus being 
beneficial for the entire economic situation. CDU/CSU is assumed to highlight the personal 
responsibility of the individuals to act in more cost-efficient ways by taking part in the 
competition. When the preferences of CDU/CSU are not matched by a reform, I expect the 
party to call for less redistributional effects in order to encourage insured persons to more 
cost-efficient behaviour.  
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Discourse analysis 
The methodological approach of the thesis focuses on the political discourse related to 
the respective healthcare reforms in Germany between 2002 and 2014. Therefore, a discourse 
analysis which examines the spoken and written expressions of the opinions of important 
political actors who are involved in the policy-making process is conducted.  
The discourse itself is used as a term to summarize how the social world is interlinked 
with sentences and utterances, and how these expressions are arranged and composed in a 
particular way to form conversation, texts and interactions. It considers language as a tool to 
inject meaning into conversations (Bryman 2008: 499-501; Jones 2012: 2-7; Wagenaar 2011). 
These meanings can be examined by performing a discourse analysis, which is seen “as the 
study of language in use” (Gee, Handford 2012: 1). In this way, a discourse analysis 
acknowledges the mode of talking, related to the issue of interest, as the subject under 
investigation. Furthermore, it includes not only linguistic themes such as the framing, general 
tenor and wording of verbal or written statements but also their inherent meanings. Thus, it 
reveals and examines how language shapes and affects the discourse as well as the public 
perception of the examined research issue.  
4.2 Material 
For this thesis the discourse analysis is supposed to provide relevant information about 
the preferences of the two political parties during the policy-making process. Therefore, it 
aims to investigate how the preferences are communicated and justified. For this reason, the 
analysis is mainly focused on political statements and other semiotics from the leading parties 
of the incumbent government coalition, when the healthcare reform policies were 
implemented. This condition is met by the SPD and CDU/CSU. The Act on the 
Modernisation of the SHI (2003) belongs to the legislative period of a Red-Green coalition of 
SPD and the Green Party, which was led by the SPD. The Act for Strengthening Competition 
in the SHI (2007) was enacted by a grand coalition of SPD and CDU/CSU while the 
Financing Act of the SHI (2011) was introduced by a CDU/CSU-led coalition, consisting of 
the CDU/CSU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).  
The Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure and the Quality of the 
SHI (2014) belongs again to a grand coalition of SPD and CDU/CSU. The temporal range of 
the acts determines the time frame of the analysis to the years 2002-2014, although the 
majority of the documents are dated very closely to the time of policy-making and decision-
taking in the parliament. The analysis utilizes primary sources such as the official 
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transcriptions of parliamentary debates or discussions as well as written releases like position 
papers, press releases, coalition agreements or programmes from the parties.  
Although all parties - including the parliamentary opposition - contributed to the 
discourse regarding the reform policies, the analysis considers only the discourse of the SPD 
and CDU/CSU for each of the reform policies. This is motivated by the leading role of SPD 
and CDU/CSU within the diverse coalitions as well as the significance of both parties for the 
German political agenda. It is important to examine the discourse of both parties for all four 
reforms in a very detailed way, even though the SPD did not support the Financing Act of 
SHI. This way it can be investigated in how far the discourse of the party changed. It also 
provides a higher level of comparability of the results. 
4.3 Validity and reliability 
The thesis research aims at achieving the highest level of validity and reliability 
possible. The methodological approach of a discourse analysis applies the appropriate tools 
and mechanisms to identify the actors’ discursive behaviour and determines their preferences 
regarding the healthcare reform policies. The statements from the parties and in particular the 
parliamentary debates during the bill readings offer a genuine view on how the political actors 
justify their diverse positions towards the policies. By utilising the discourse of the two 
parties who led a government coalition during at least one legislative period between 2002 
and 2014, it is possible to achieve a high level of comparability of each actor’s preferences 
over time. This enhances the external validity which leads to more credible general statements 
(Bryman 2008: 376-377). Nevertheless, the level of generalization is limited in terms of the 
parties and country. The findings of one particular country cannot be generalised to other 
countries which differ in their partisan settings, party or political systems.  
All the used semiotics of the actors are officially released and accessible to the public, 
which allows other researchers to easily comprehend and replicate the findings. However, the 
selection of the relevant discourse elements as well as their interpretation can be subject to the 
personal considerations of the author. This can lead to situational bias and therefore decrease 
the level of validity and reliability. 
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5 Analysis 
5.1 The four reform policies of the German 
healthcare system 
5.1.1 The Act on the Modernisation of the SHI 
On the 26th September 2003 the German Bundestag passed the legislative draft of the 
Act on the Modernisation of the SHI with 517 votes out of 574. The government coalition 
parties SPD and Green Party but also the CDU/CSU-faction3 predominantly voted in favour 
of the law; however, several representatives from SPD, CDU/CSU and the entire FDP-faction 
rejected the proposal. The federal council approved the law on the 17th of October 2003. 
Hence the federal government enacted the law on the 14th of November 2003.  
The Act was aiming on reducing the contribution rate for the SHI and further keeping 
it on a stable level. For this purpose, it introduced several important regulations for the 
healthcare system, including cutbacks of benefits from the SHI. The SHI was exempted from 
paying the costs for extraneous benefits such as maternity grant and sickness benefit, which 
then were covered by tax subsidies. The birth and death grant as well as the subsidy for 
spectacles were cancelled. Furthermore, patients were obliged to pay higher co-payments for 
pharmaceuticals and most non-prescribed pharmaceuticals were excluded from SHI catalogue 
of benefits. In exchange, the act implemented a cap for the administrative costs of the SHI 
until 2007 which is active as long as the costs would exceed the average administrative 
expenditures of all SHI by ten per cent. The SHI were committed to publish detailed records 
about personal and administrative costs on request of their members (Deutscher Bundestag 
2003a).  
The Act also focused on changing the financing structure of the SHI. The practice fee 
was introduced in order to enhance the personal responsibility of insured persons and promote 
a model in which general physicians function as gatekeepers. All insured persons of age had 
to pay a lump-sum of ten Euro for visiting a doctor or dentist. They were exempted from the 
fee if the visit was a preventive medical check-up, they visit the same physician during the 
same quarter or had a medical referral to another physician. Furthermore, only the insured 
persons and not the employers had to pay for an additional special contribution of 0.9 per 
cent, which was supposed to be sufficient for dental-care insurance. The act also determined 
the introduction of an obligatory electronic health card for 2006 in order to enhance 
transparency and prevent abuse of healthcare services. The insured persons were allowed to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 In the following, the term faction is used as a standardised label for the party’s faction in the federal parliament 
(Deutscher Bundestag). 
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request receipts from their physicians to make the treatment costs more visible and 
comprehensible. Additionally, the SHI was allowed to offer bonus and reimbursement 
programmes to the insured persons as a measure to increase health insurance autonomy 
(Bundesgesetzblatt 2003; Deutscher Bundestag 2003a).  
5.1.2 The Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI 
The Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI was approved by the parliament on 
the 2nd of February 2007 with 378 votes out of 592. The majority of representatives from the 
government coalition factions of CDU/CSU and SPD promoted the act, while a minority of 
these factions as well as the entire factions of FDP, Green Party and Left Party rejected the 
act. This legislative draft has already been elaborated in cooperation with the federal council 
and was published in the Federal Law Gazette on the 26th of March 2007. 
The act implemented fundamentally changes to the financing structure of the 
healthcare system. From the 1st of January 2009 the contribution rate of the SHI was 
determined by law at 15.5 per cent, from which employers contribute 7.3 per cent and 
employees 8.2 per cent. At the same time all contributions to the SHI from employers, 
employees and tax subsidies were directed and gathered in the Healthcare Fund 
(Gesundheitsfond). The Healthcare Fund redistributes the resources to the health insurances 
paying only a lump-sum for each insured person of the insurance. However, the risk structure 
compensation scheme was also adjusted to the Healthcare Fund and determined the 
allocations to the SHI on several health indicators such as age, sex or morbidity of the 
respective members. The SHI was also committed to offer more bonus and reward 
programmes to their members in order to encourage preventive medical check-ups. Several 
services were integrated into the catalogue of benefits such as parent-child-cures and 
vaccinations. In case, health insurances could not pay all their expenditures from the 
distributed funds, they were allowed to charge an additional contribution up to one per cent of 
the insured persons’ gross incomes. In exchange, insured persons were offered a less 
complicated procedure to switch health insurance featuring a special right of cancellation and 
were allowed to switch from the SHI to the PHI after exceeding the Annual Income Limit for 
three years in a row. These measures were supposed to strengthen the competition among the 
SHI, thus encouraging the SHI to perform more efficient (Bundesgesetzblatt 2007; Deutscher 
Bundestag 2006b).  
Furthermore, the performance-based remuneration for physicians was introduced, 
making the payment structure for physicians more transparent and comprehensible. All 
citizens were obliged to join a health insurance scheme, either the PHI or the SHI. This 
regulation also includes all citizens who were previously refused to re-enter the insurance 
scheme by the health insurances (Bundesgesetzblatt 2007). 
5.1.3 The Financing Act of the SHI 
On the 12th of November 2010 the parliament passed the Financing Act of SHI with 
305 out of 558 votes. The factions of the government coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP 
approved the legislative draft while it was rejected by representatives from the oppositional 
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parties SPD, Green Party and Left Party. The act was approved by the federal council on the 
17th of December and enacted on the 22nd of December 2010.  
It introduced further changes of the financing structure of the healthcare system. The 
contribution rate was raised from previously 14.94 to 15.5 per cent. The employers’ share was 
raised from 7.0 to 7.3 per cent and the employees’ share was increased from 7.9 to 8.2 per 
cent. The contribution rate of employers was frozen at the determined value of 7.3 per cent 
while further rising healthcare costs were supposed to be financed through additional 
contribution from the employees. The amount of this additional contribution was not income 
related nor capped at one per cent of the insured person’s income anymore. Instead, the act 
implemented a social compensation in case the average additional contribution was exceeding 
two per cent of the income. The administrative costs of the SHI in 2011 and 2012 were frozen 
at the level of 2010. The time period for the opportunity to switch from the SHI to the PHI 
after exceeding the Annual Income Limit was lowered to one year. All these measures were 
supposed to further stabilize the financing of the SHI, hence securing the healthcare system 
for the future. At the same time, the competition among the SHI and the PHI was enforced 
based on the assumption that the SHI was encouraged to achieve a more efficient 
performance. The separation of the contribution rate of employers and employees was meant 
to decouple healthcare costs from non-wage labour costs. This was expected to secure and 
strengthen the business location of Germany (Bundesgesetzblatt 2010; Deutscher Bundestag 
2010d). 
5.1.4 The Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure 
 and the Quality of the SHI    
The Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure and the Quality of the 
SHI passed the Bundestag with the votes of the coalition factions of CDU/CSU and SPD on 
the 5th of June 2014. Although the minority factions of Green Party and Left Party rejected 
the act, it was not a roll-call vote. Since the law did not have to pass the Federal Council 
(Bundesrat), it could be already enacted and announced on the 21st of July 2014. 
The former implemented crucial changes in the financing structure of the SHI. The 
contribution rate of employers and employees in parity was re-established, cancelling the 
additional special contribution of 0.9 per cent from the Act on the Modernisation of the SHI 
in 2003. Thus, the basic contribution rate was set to 14.6 per cent, from which employers and 
employees both contribute 7.3 per cent. Additionally, the lump-sum additional contribution of 
the insured persons to the SHI was cancelled. Instead, health insurances were only allowed to 
charge an income-related additional contribution from the insured persons when it aimed to 
offset the shortfall in revenues. Moreover, the social compensation linked to a relatively high 
bureaucratic burden was given up as well as the opportunity for the SHI to pay a bonus to 
their members. In case a health insurance charged an additional contribution or increased an 
already existing additional contribution, the insured persons were entitled to use a special 
right of termination that shortened the notice period of the current contract from 18 to only 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4
 The general contribution rate was decreased to 14.9 per cent (employers 7.0, employees 7.9) by a government 
resolution on the 1st of July 2009. 
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two months. The health insurance was even obliged to inform each of its members about the 
opportunity to switch to a cheaper insurance using the special right of termination. These 
regulations were expected to make it easier for insured persons to switch to more efficient and 
cheaper SHI while it also enhanced the competition among the SHI (Bundesgesetzblatt 2014; 
Deutscher Bundestag 2014b).  
Furthermore, the act established a new scientific and independent institute for securing 
quality and transparency in the healthcare system. The latter was supposed to start working in 
2015; covering tasks of quality monitoring and submitting proposals to strengthen quality or 
transparency within the healthcare system (BMG 2014e). 
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Table 1. Reform Policies and Strategies of Cost Containment and Recalibration 
  Cost Containment  
Reform Recalibration Cut of Benefits Competition Financing structure 
Act on the Modernisation of the SHI 
(2003) 
 
- Charge of a practice fee 
- Physicians as gatekeepers  
- Cancellation of childbirth and death 
grant  
- Exclusion of non-prescribed 
pharmaceuticals from SHI-catalogue  
- Increase of additional charges for 
pharmaceuticals 
- SHI are forced to cap administrative 
costs per member at max. 10 % 
- Management’s salary records & 
administrative costs have to be 
published 
- Introduction of a practice fee  
 
Act for Strengthening Competition in 
the SHI (2007) 
  
Catalogue of benefits 
extended by several 
treatments (vaccinations) 
- - Health insurances can charge an 
additional contribution  
- Distribution ratio of revenues from 
Healthcare Fund rewards more efficient 
working health insurances  
- General Healthcare Fund effective in 2009;  
- Contribution rate is set at 15.5 % (from 2009) 
- Health insurances can charge an additional 
contribution considering certain limitations  
Financing Act of the SHI (2010) 
 
- - - Income threshold (SHI) only requires 
to be exceeded 1 year (previously 3 
years) for being legitimated to switch to 
PHI  
- Health insurances are bound to keep 
administrative expenditures for 
2011/2012 on same level as in 2010 
 
- Health insurances can set amount of additional 
contribution without limitations  
- Social compensation is introduced in case additional 
contribution exceeds 2 % of gross income 
- Contribution rate is increased to 15.5 %;  
Share of employees (7.3% + 0.9 % special contribution) 
is alterable while employers’ share is fixed (7.3 %) 
Act for the further Development of the 
Financial Structure and the Quality of 
the SHI (2014) 
 
 - - Insured persons get special right of 
cancellation in case of SHI charges or 
increases additional contribution  
 
SHI must notify their members about 
special right of cancellation and the 
opportunity to switch to a health 
insurance with lower charges  
- Contribution rate is set to 14.6 %; both employees and 
employers contribute the same rate of 7.3 %  
 
- Charge of additional contribution must be income-
related  
 
- Cancellation of social compensation  
 
Notes: This table depicts the reform policies and identified strategies of cost containment and recalibration. The table is adapted from Häusermann (2010): 102-103.  
Sources: Bundesgesetzblatt 2003; Bundesgesetzblatt 2007; Bundesgesetzblatt 2010; Bundesgesetzblatt 2014. 
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5.2 The discourse of SPD and CDU/CSU 
5.2.1 The discourse on the Act on the Modernisation of the SHI 
The following section outlines the discourse of the different involved parties during 
the legislative process of the reform acts mentioned above. Both SPD and CDU/CSU 
recognised the need for the reform in order to rebalance the healthcare financing structure 
while also preventing a rise in the contribution rate. The SPD highlighted that many policy 
measures were regrettable but were the inevitable result of budget constraints and intense 
negotiations. The CDU/CSU emphasised its optimism that the reform could achieve its 
objective to decrease the costs. The additional burdens for the insured persons were justified 
as unfortunate but necessary and the patients were asked to demonstrate more personal 
responsibility.  
Initially, the discourse on the Act on the Modernisation of the SHI in 2003 is assessed; 
starting with statements from the SPD as the government-leading party before turning to 
CDU/CSU as the main oppositional party. 
The SPD recognised the continuing need for reform of the healthcare system already 
in the coalition agreement of the 15th legislative period, which was published by the Red-
Green coalition on the 16th of October 2002. It clearly called for “more quality and more 
competition in healthcare” (SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 53). Furthermore, the 
agreement attempted to put general physicians into the position of gatekeepers while it also 
aimed at a higher level of transparency and patients’ personal responsibility (ibid: 54-56). 
Thereby, the SPD was the home party of the incumbent German chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
as well as the leading party of the government coalition. Thus, the former was centrally 
involved in the planning and designing process of the legislative draft. In March 2003 the 
government declaration from Schröder pointed out the need for reform of the German 
healthcare system and suspected a big share of the costs to be caused by inefficiency. 
Therefore, Schröder outlined a forthcoming reform that required the cooperation of all parties 
in the parliament and stated that “competition needs to be allowed and encouraged by the 
state to reduce incrustation of healthcare structures” (Deutscher Bundestag 2003b: 2490). In 
June 2003 the SPD and the Green Party presented an early legislative draft of the “Act of the 
Modernisation of the Healthcare System” (Deutscher Bundestag 2003a: 1), which again 
acknowledged the need to reform the healthcare system due to financial pressures and 
outdated structures. Among other reform measures, the draft contained the implementation of 
a practice fee of 15 Euro per quarter year (ibid.: 6). However, as a result of the negotiations 
between the government coalition and CDU/CSU and controversies within the SPD, the final 
draft suggested only 10 Euro per quarter.  
During the second and third bill reading in the parliament in October 2003, Klaus 
Kirschner claimed that the final Act on the Modernisation of the SHI was the result of an 
extensively debated cross-party consensus which ensured quality and economic performance 
of the healthcare system. Nevertheless, Kirschner, who represented the SPD in the Committee 
of Health and Social Security (Gesundheitsausschuss) of the Bundestag, saw “no reason for 
euphoria” (Bundestag 2003c: 5466) emphasising the additional burden for the insured 
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persons. In the same manner, Gudrun Schaich-Walch, vice-chairperson of the SPD faction, 
emphasised that the three cooperating political parties took a great responsibility to maintain 
the solidaristic principle of the health insurance while cutting several services which are 
considered to be non-insurance benefits. In this way, it would be possible to achieve a 
stabilised contribution rate which was a primary target of the reform (Deutscher Bundestag 
2003c: 5458-5459). The SPD acknowledged that the maintenance of the welfare state in the 
future is tied to the question of funding. The practice fee as a financial burden on users was 
seen as a controversial but necessary element. Accordingly, health minister Ulla Schmidt 
from the SPD declared at the according party-conference in November 2003 that “Social 
Democracy is not determined by a practice fee of ten euro per quarter year” (SPD 
Parteivorstand 2003: 458). 
How did CDU/CSU perceive the Act on the Modernisation of the SHI? Before 
CDU/CSU joined the negotiations with the government coalition about a mutual legislative 
draft, the party criticised the legislative proposal of the Act of the Modernisation of the 
Healthcare System for being too paternalistic and bureaucratic, handing in its own proposal 
for a “liberal and humane healthcare system - think and design health policy in a new way” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003e) in June 2003. In this proposal, the Christian Democrats 
questioned the attainability of the government coalition’s goal of lastingly lowering the 
contribution rate and claimed that the implementation of a practice fee will decrease the 
accessibility of specialist physicians, thus leading to a lower quality of healthcare (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2003e.: 4-6). In the further discourse, CDU/CSU clarified its willingness to 
cooperate with the government coalition to find a compromise solution which could be 
supported by all involved parties. During a parliamentary speech in June 2003 the party’s 
chairperson Angela Merkel underlined the need for a reform and mutual goals such as a low 
contribution rate and a good quality of healthcare. Furthermore, she demanded a fair 
procedure for the negotiations but offered the “will to jointly enforce everything that we 
jointly can enforce” (Deutscher Bundestag 2003d: 4204).  
After negotiations with the SPD and the Green Party, the CDU/CSU approved the 
proposal of the mutual Act on the Modernisation of the SHI. In August 2003 Wolfgang 
Zöller, health policy spokesperson of the CSU and vice chairperson of the Committee of 
Health and Social Security, pointed out that the reform could potentially decrease the 
contribution rate and non-wage labour costs. Zöller also emphasised the significance of 
keeping negotiated promises (Die Zeit 2003). Consequently, within the parliamentary debate 
of the second and third reading in September 2003, various CDU/CSU speakers supported the 
legislative draft as an opportunity to settle the financial issue of the healthcare system. Thus, 
the reform aimed at “securing [affordable] healthcare for everyone” (Deutscher Bundestag 
2003c: 5473). Moreover, CDU/CSU claimed that its participation prevented the 
implementation of a “governmental healthcare system” (ibid.: 5469) by the Red-Green 
coalition. Furthermore, cuts of benefits and additional burdens for insured persons were 
justified as unfortunate but necessary and an obligatory part of a - sometimes painful - 
compromise. However, Zöller referred to a strengthening of the patients’ position in the 
healthcare system and argued that “personal responsibility of patients means much more than 
just an increased financial burden” (ibid.: 5460). 
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5.2.2 The discourse on the Act for Strengthening Competition in the 
 SHI 
How did CDU/CSU and SPD perceive the Act for Strengthening Competition in the 
SHI in 2007? Both parties appreciated the elements of competition among SHI. The 
CDU/CSU considered the attempts to decouple non-wage labour costs from rising healthcare 
costs as a success. The party emphasised that no cuts of benefits were implemented, thus 
justifying the reform to be a good deal for the insured persons. The SPD highlighted the new 
Healthcare Fund and the reintegration of all citizens into health insurance in a positive 
manner. The party justified the policy as an achievement of Social Democratic politics.  To 
begin with, how did CDU/CSU justify its position towards the act? Subsequently this section 
assesses the position of the SPD.  
In the coalition agreement with the SPD in November 2005, both parties already stated 
that the quality of the German healthcare system, its medical performance and financial 
stability needed to be secured for the future (CDU, CSU, SPD 2005: 102-103). In a common 
benchmark paper with its coalition partner from July 2006, the CDU/CSU explained several 
reform issues. Thus, the financing structure of healthcare needed to be reformed and 
competitive elements among the SHI as well as regularities concerning the remuneration of 
physicians needed to be enhanced. CDU/CSU and SPD motivated the reform in reference to 
the varying healthcare quality standards across the country and inefficient use of financial 
resources (CDU, CSU, SPD 2006). Further on, in various press releases from 2006, the 
CDU/CSU claimed that the reform policy was far-reaching and trend-setting by securing 
health insurance for every citizen and enhancing competition and transparency within the 
healthcare system (CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag 2006a). While supporting 
the act proposal, Zöller emphasised that “further cuts of benefits are unjustifiable” 
(CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag 2006b) and consequently were not 
incorporated into the reform proposal considering the already introduced profound measures 
from the Act on the Modernisation of the SHI in 2003 (CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag 2006c). Moreover, the CDU/CSU-faction’s health policy spokesperson Annette 
Widmann-Mauz highlighted the efforts of the reform. Thus, it aimed to improve transparency 
and competition within the healthcare system and attempted to partly decouple non-wage 
labour costs from healthcare costs. Thereby, she was supported by Hans-Georg Faust, the vice 
chairperson of the Committee of Health and Social Security from the CDU/CSU who pointed 
out the reform’s aim to further improve and secure a high level of quality of the German 
healthcare system (CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag 2006d; Deutscher 
Bundestag 2006a: 5989-5990).  
In further parliamentary debates, Zöller mentioned necessary measures such as more 
competition among healthcare actors, the performance-based remuneration of physicians and 
a middle term reduction of non-wage labour costs in order to achieve those goals (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2006a: 5973-5975; Deutscher Bundestag 2007a: 8011-8013). Furthermore, 
CDU/CSU justifieed the reform as a response to critics on the legislative draft from the 
parliamentary opposition as well as physicians’ and health industry’s associations 
(CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag 2006e). CDU/CSU claimed to “consider the 
established structures” (Deutscher Bundestag 2007a: 8040) during the negotiations of the 
reform and accused the opposition of providing “no answers for the outstanding issues” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2007b: 7500). During the second and third reading of the bill, different 
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statements of representatives such as Widmann-Mauz and Zöller depicted the party’s eventual  
support for the reform and its positive impact on competition and transparency (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2007a) while being “addressed to the patients and insured persons” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2007a: 8011). 
How did the SPD perceive the Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI? 
Basically, the SPD claimed that the act included every citizen into the insurance scheme and 
achieved a fair balanced competition among the SHI and the PHI while maintaining the 
solidaristic financing of healthcare in Germany. For this purpose, the party saw the need for a 
reform policy already in the beginning of 2006 stating that “solidarity stays the fundamental 
element” (SPD Parteivorstand 2006: 5). With Ulla Schmidt as a health minister, the party 
endorsed the legislative draft of the Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI at various 
occasions. The SPD depicted the reform as beneficial to insured persons and patients. Thus, 
various party representatives pointed out that the reform policy provided health insurance for 
each citizen. In contrast to previous healthcare reforms, the act contained no plans for a cut of 
benefits instead, it placed more value on preventive treatments (Deutscher Bundestag 2006a: 
5968; Deutscher Bundestag 2007a: 8018-8019). Carola Reimann, the health policy 
spokesperson of the SPD-faction, claimed that “benefit reductions mostly affect the weak and 
poor [...] and are no solutions for Social Democrats” (Deutscher Bundestag 2006a: 5981).  
In the further discourse between October 2006 and February 2007, the SPD 
highlighted the eponymous basic principle of the reform - the strengthening of competition 
among health insurances. The party stated that the reform and the Healthcare Fund terminated 
the competition among SHIs for members with lower health risk indicators. Instead, the act 
strongly encouraged SHIs to compete with each other through an appropriate catalogue of 
benefits combined with an efficient administrative body. Insured persons were assumed to 
switch to more efficient health insurances while being rewarded with bonus programmes 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2006a: 5980-5981; Deutscher Bundestag 2007a: 8007-8008). 
According to Peter Friedrich, a member of the Committee of Health and Social Security, the 
reform was “creating more competition on the correct side” (Deutscher Bundestag 2007a: 
8041). Furthermore, Schmidt stated that “we do not need 250 [statutory] health insurances nor 
seven national associations of statutory health insurance with seven executive boards” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2006a: 5970). The SPD-faction defended the reform proposal against 
critique from other already mentioned (political) actors in the healthcare system and in 
particular from the parliamentary opposition. Thus, the opposition’s critique on the reform 
was considered to be “contradictive in itself” (Deutscher Bundestag 2007a: 8041) and 
groundless; moreover, counterproposals did not become “more valid by repeating them” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2006a: 5991). Finally, representatives of the SPD affirmed that 
constitutional concerns have been considered by the ministry’s law department and various 
court decisions. Hence, discussions on constitutional concerns were irrational (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2007b: 7489; 7497). 
5.2.3 The discourse on the Financing Act of the SHI 
Starting with the CDU/CSU and continuing with the SPD, how did both parties justify 
their preferences towards the Financing Act of the SHI? The CDU/CSU appreciated the 
changes of the financing structure and recognised great attempts to relieve the employers and 
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economy from more burdens. The reform was justified because it promoted cost-efficient 
behaviour of insured persons and SHI, as well as tackled the financial deficit. In contrast, the 
SPD condemned most reform measures as unjust for individuals with lower or middle 
incomes and as enforcing a three-class healthcare system? The party disapproved of the policy 
and in particular the non-income related additional contribution as a “capitation fee”.  
In October 2009 CDU/CSU considered a further healthcare reform with the goal to 
create and promote an innovation friendly, performance-focused and future-securing financed 
healthcare system. Moreover, the coalition agreement with the FDP stated financing and 
competition as prominent features of such a policy (CDU, CSU, FDP 2009: 84-87). During 
the governmental declaration in November 2009, the federal chancellor Angela Merkel 
declared that there was a need for a “stronger decoupling of non-wage labour costs from 
healthcare costs than today” (Deutscher Bundestag 2009: 36). In September 2010 the 
legislative draft of the Financing Act of the SHI was introduced; it depicted the initial point of 
further intense discussions in the parliament. The CDU/CSU stressed that the SHI’s estimated 
financial deficit in 2011 was about nine billion Euro and thus justified a strong need for 
action. Various party representatives declared that “this deficit needs to be sorted out first” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 6476) with the “participation of all healthcare [actors]” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2010b: 7866). Furthermore, the CDU/CSU claimed that the opposition 
and in particular the SPD had no elaborated and economically tested alternative concept. 
Instead, the Christian Democrats argued that the opposition propagated untrue accusations 
and suggested that the critique was mostly unfounded (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 6469-
6471; 6478-6480).  
Furthermore, Dietrich Monstadt from the Committee of Health and Social Security 
argued that “the SPD does not remember its own actions” (Deutscher Bundestag 2010c: 7470) 
while the vice chairperson of the CDU/CSU-faction Johannes Singhammer stated that “once 
[referring to the last legislative period] the SPD acted responsibly and was part of the 
decision-making” (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 6460). Finally, the Christian Democrats 
announced that by setting a default value for the employers’ share of contribution rate, the 
reform policy was an important step to decouple healthcare costs from non-wage labour costs. 
“This is just, [...] because it ensures jobs and brings more people from unemployment to 
employment” (ibid.: 6460). For insured persons, exactly calculated additional contributions 
were more comprehensible than a percentage of wage. Consequently, there would be “a whole 
new willingness to switch” (ibid.: 6473) to health insurances with lower rates but the same 
catalogue of benefits. Thus, the introduction of unlimited additional contributions and a social 
compensation for low-income individuals allowed even more competition among the SHI. 
How did the SPD perceive the Financing Act of the SHI? In the first half of 2010 the 
Social Democrats already accused the government coalition and their healthcare reform 
ambitions of following an unsatisfactory agenda of clientelism. The party claimed that the 
coalition “primarily aims on unburdening the employers” (SPD-Bundestagsfraktion 2010b) 
and “make[s] the insured persons pay the bill alone” (SPD-Bundestagsfraktion 2010a). The 
chairperson of the Bundestags-faction Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared that the reform plans 
were a disaster; since as the reform would mostly affect individuals with low and middle 
incomes, it would be unsocial (ibid.). The SPD referred to the status of the healthcare system 
after the SPD participation in government until 2009 and called for a Citizens Insurance 
(Bürgerversicherung) that would aim to integrate members from the PHI into the SHI (SPD-
Bundestagsfraktion 2009). Inasmuch, the SPD explicitly refused to accept the proposal of the 
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Financing Act of the SHI for various reasons. The expected changes to the contribution rate 
were seen as the “beginning of the termination of financing in parity” (SPD-
Bundestagsfraktion 2010c) and show how the coalition intended to “cash up pensioners and 
low-income individuals” (Deutscher Bundestag 2010b: 7872). Carola Reimann, chairperson 
of the Committee of Health and Social Security, criticised the competition elements of the 
reform as to the advantage the PHI. Thus, it would not tackle “unequal treatment of PHI and 
SHI members which is a major issue of the healthcare system” (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 
6481).  
Furthermore, the SPD doubted the effectiveness of the stimulus for especially older 
people to switch the health insurance. The SPD perceived the additional contributions as a 
partial introduction of a Capitation Fee (Kopfpauschale) although the CDU/CSU denied that 
they pursued this project any longer (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 6477-6478). The SPD 
announced that the regulation for the elective reimbursement of healthcare treatment costs for 
member of SHI marks the starting point for a “three-tier-system of healthcare” (SPD-
Bundestagsfraktion 2010d). This change was further seen as a hidden gift to the physicians to 
cash up additional services considering that the “average rate of reimbursement for the 
members of SHI is just at 50 per cent of the costs” (Deutscher Bundestag 2010b: 7860). The 
spokesperson of the SPD in the Committee of Health and Social Security Karl Lauterbach 
accused the coalition of pursuing “clientele politics for employer associations and the PHI” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 6468) and complained about the PHI being excluded from 
additional burdens. The vice chairperson of the SPD-faction Elke Ferner summarised the 
critique of the SPD by stating that the “reform proposal shows the true attempt to break the 
welfare state with a wrecking ball” (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 6457). 
5.2.4 The discourse on the Act for the further Development of the 
 Financial Structure and the Quality of the SHI 
How did firstly the CDU/CSU and secondly the SPD justify its position towards the 
Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure and the Quality of the SHI? Both 
parties revealed their contentment about the elements of further competition among the SHI, 
and the creation of more incentives to perform more cost-efficiently. The CDU/CSU regretted 
the cancellation of the non-income related additional contribution but justified its support as a 
necessary trade-off for the political compromise. The party was satisfied with lower 
contribution rates in order to foster economic growth. In contrast, the SPD was pleased with 
the cancellation of the lump-sum additional contributions. The party recognised the reform 
measures as socially compatible. The SPD stated that the policy did not reach far enough and 
justified it as a political compromise with trade-offs for both sides.  
In December 2013 the coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD announced 
several changes concerning the financing of the healthcare system (CDU, CSU, SPD 2013: 
59) due to the expected consequences of the demographic change (CDU/CSU-Fraktion im 
Deutschen Bundestag 2014). Accordingly, the legislative drafts from April and May 2014 
emphasised the “positive development of the SHI finances in the last years” (Bundesrat 2014: 
1) while also estimating that “the yearly healthcare expenditures of the SHI will exceed the 
yearly revenues of the Healthcare Fund” (Deutscher Bundestag 2014a: 1) in the future. The 
Christian Democrats appreciated the reduction of the contribution rate as a relief for insured 
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persons and the continuous fixed determination of the employers’ rate at 7.3 per cent since the 
healthcare costs would remain decoupled from non-wage labour costs. According to health 
minister Hermann Gröhe this regulation promoted growth, prosperity and consecutive 
employment by “preventing additional [financial] burden through increasing non-wage labour 
costs” (Deutscher Bundestag 2014c: 2867).  
Furthemore, the health policy spokesperson of the CDU/CSU-faction Spahn regretted 
the abolition of the lump-sum additional contributions and highlighted that compromises 
require a “working-together of both sides” (ibid.: 2874). In exchange, the CDU/CSU was 
satisfied with the introduction of the income-related additional contribution by the SHI. It was 
supposed to encourage the SHI to invest in even more efficient administrative processes in 
order to “avoid losing members to competitors” (ibid.: 2884). The party emphasised the 
exceptional right to terminate the charge of additional contributions for members of the SHI; 
setting the “price competition at the level of the amount of additional contributions” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2014c: 2881). Further on, various party speakers claimed that the 
reform also provided appropriate measures to increase and monitor the quality of healthcare. 
The parliamentary state secretary Widmann-Mauz claimed it introduced an “independent and 
scientific institute” (Deutscher Bundestag 2014d: 3373) that could secure quality and 
transparency in the healthcare system. Accordingly, it should provide precise information 
about faults and inefficiencies within the healthcare scheme. Moreover, the CDU/CSU 
accused the parliamentary opposition of being inactive and emphasized their own actions 
(ibid.: 3381).  
How did the SPD perceive the Act for the further Development of the Financial 
Structure and the Quality of the SHI? As the coalition partner of CDU/CSU, the SPD 
basically shared the goals of the mutual coalition agreement. Besides, the SPD also 
highlighted the need for a reform in order to secure the financing of the SHI in the future and 
to enhance competition among the SHI (Bundesrat 2014: 1-3; Deutscher Bundestag 2014a: 1-
3). The abolishment of the “unspeakable [...] capitation fee” (Deutscher Bundestag 2014d: 
3379)was a declared goal of the Social Democrats. The SPD considered lump-sum based 
additional contributions as being a “small capitation fee” (SPD-Bundestagsfraktion 2014a). 
Accordingly, Lauterbach proclaimed the rejection of non-income-related additional 
contributions and the integration of income-related additional contributions “as a step towards 
more solidarity in our healthcare system” (Deutscher Bundestag 2014d: 3375). Although the 
SPD considered income-related additional contributions to be more fair, the party was not 
satisfied with the persisting fixed determination of the employer’s contribution rate. In 
addition, the SPD strived for an upheaval of the SHI’s financing through a Citizens Insurance 
(ibid.: 3375-3376). However, various party speakers stated that  cooperation in a coalition 
requires negotiations, making “compromises necessary” (Deutscher Bundestag 2014c: 2877) 
and makes the deferment of several goals unavoidable. Furthermore, the Social Democrats 
emphasised that the reform policy was supposed to promote solidarity; thus, an revenue 
compensation for the SHI will be introduced within the risk structure compensation scheme 
for the SHI. It strengthened the position of the health insurance funds with a low-income 
member structure. Thus, the income compensation scheme enhanced the competition among 
SHI while also supporting members (Deutscher Bundestag 2014c: 2872; SPD-
Bundestagsfraktion 2014b). Moreover, the SPD was in favour of introducing an independent 
institute for securing quality and transparency in the healthcare system. Accordingly, it is 
supposed to collect and examine data in order to find weak points and elaborate on solutions. 
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The prevention of unnecessary expenditures and procedures from healthcare actors such as 
hospitals was a main objective (Deutscher Bundestag 2014c: 2883). Overall, the SPD strongly 
supported the Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure and the Quality of 
the SHI and promoted it. 
5.3 Discourse Analysis  
This section analyses and discusses the reform policy related discourse of both SPD 
and CDU/CSU. For this purpose, the positions and justification of the parties are examined 
considering the expected policy preferences of the parties.  
5.3.1 Discourse Analysis of the Act on the Modernisation of the SHI 
The first analysis scrutinises the discourse related to the Act on the Modernisation of 
the SHI by the SPD, followed by CDU/CSU. 
The Act on the Modernisation of the SHI contained a couple of measures that were 
aimed at reducing healthcare costs through cost containment strategies. While several benefits 
such as death and birth grants were cut from the SHI catalogue, others like maternity grant 
and sickness benefit were outsourced and financed by the state. The competition among SHI 
was increased in a rather slight level. The SHI were obliged to cap administrative costs until 
2007 and publish records of their administrative expenditures. Nevertheless, the opportunities 
for users to switch between SHIs were not enhanced. The financing structure was changed by 
implementing the additional special contribution of 0.9 per cent as well as the practice fee of 
ten euro. Both measures placed additional costs for healthcare onto users. The practise fee 
regulated the access on an individual level and was supposed to establish and strengthen a 
gate-keeping function of general physicians in order to lower the cases of self-referrals. It was 
claimed that such gatekeepers and fees could be helpful in decreasing the number of - from a 
medical perspective - unnecessary and expensive visits of specialist. From this perspective, 
both concepts were intended as recalibration strategies to change an unwanted behaviour of 
the users. 
According to the applied theories of power resources and partisanship as well as the 
derived policy preferences of the Social Democrats, most measures of the Act on the 
Modernisation of the SHI were designed in a way that does not fit to the expected party 
preferences. The strategies for cost containment and recalibration burdened the insured 
persons with extra costs and even emphasised individual levels of healthcare financing. 
Moreover, the introduction of an additional special contribution just paid by employees 
removed the parity in the financing of SHI between employers and employees. However, the 
outsourcing of benefits by shifting the financing from SHI to the state’s budget matches the 
preferences of the SPD for a strong state. The slightly enhanced competition among SHI is 
also in favour of assumed SPD preferences. Overall, the reform did mostly not meet the 
preferences of the party, although the SPD was essentially involved in its design and 
implementation.  
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In the political debates the SPD stressed that the reform is necessary due to the in-
deficit financing of health care and inefficiencies within healthcare structures. The party 
recognised the budget constraints and the need to act in responsibility to secure the future 
financing of the German healthcare system. The driving force was the reduction of healthcare 
costs while also preventing a further rise in the contribution rate. Therefore, the party 
accepted the reform as inevitable and claimed that Social Democracy is not defined by these 
individual measures. However, various speakers of the SPD acknowledged that the reform 
contains many deep cuts for the insured persons and expressed their regret about it. 
Furthermore, the party highlighted the reform being a product of very intense negotiations 
with CDU/CSU and declared that political compromises necessitate making unpleasant 
decisions. Overall, the SPD approved the reform and was crucially involved in its 
implementation and justification even though most of the reform contents were in conflict 
with the expected party preferences. 
In how far did the reform meet the preferences of CDU/CSU and how did the party 
justify its position? According to the theoretical considerations of this thesis, the Christian 
Democrats are supposed to endorse expenditure reducing reforms including cutbacks of 
healthcare benefits in a considerably stronger way than the SPD. Moreover, CDU/CSU is 
assumed to aim at reducing the financial burden of employers and being less hesitant to put 
more costs on the individual users. The party is expected to prefer market reforms, which 
stimulate the competition among health insurances while requesting more personal 
responsibility and choices for the insured persons. 
The applied cost containment strategies had great potential for cost-saving effects by 
putting more personal responsibility and direct costs onto insured persons. The introduction of 
a practise fee even strengthened the individual dimension of healthcare access while 
gatekeeping physicians were supposed to counteract inefficient processes. Although 
CDU/CSU indeed advocated higher co-payments for each medical treatment, those kinds of 
recalibration measures fit the party’s preferences. Moreover, the additional special 
contribution for employees relieved the employers and was an initial step to decouple 
healthcare cost and non-wage labour costs. Nevertheless, the financing of services by the state 
instead of the SHI is not in the interest of the party. The implemented elements of competition 
were rather marginal and do not match CDU/CSU preference for more competition. Overall, 
the reform policy of the Act on the Modernisation of the SHI matches the expected policy 
preferences of CDU/CSU in most cases. Thus, it can be assumed that the party enforced most 
of the reform measures.  
In the political discourse CDU/CSU highlighted the significance of their participation 
in the decision-making process for averting a strongly criticised reform proposal from the 
government coalition. Hence, the party announced confidently that the Act on the 
Modernisation of the SHI can achieve its main objective of lowering and stabilizing the 
contribution rate to SHI without creating more bureaucracy. Although the party doubted the 
compatibility of the practise fee with a guarantee for high healthcare quality, the introduction 
of new financial burdens on users was appreciated as unfortunate but necessary. 
Representatives of CDU/CSU demanded more personal responsibility of healthcare users 
even beyond the reform measures. Although the reform mostly matched the assumed policy 
preferences, the Christian Democrats took great efforts to actually justify their support for the 
reform. 
  36 
5.3.2 Discourse Analysis of the Act for Strengthening Competition in 
 the SHI 
The next section scrutinises the discourse related to the Act for Strengthening 
Competition in the SHI by the government leading party CDU/CSU, followed by the 
government coalition partner SPD. 
The Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI comprised of different measures to 
reform the healthcare system. The greatest changes were conducted regarding the financing 
structure and competition. The introduction of the Healthcare Fund as the main institution for 
pooling and redistributing health insurance contributions to the SHI changed the financing 
structure and strengthened competition at the same time. On the one side, it ended the 
structural advantages for SHI with a higher-income and lower-risk member structure, hence 
encouraging SHI to work more efficiently and achieve their performance goals with similarly 
structured revenues. On the other side, the SHI had to pay all expenditures from the 
Healthcare Fund’s allocations and were obliged to charge an additional contribution up to one 
per cent of the insured persons’ gross income in case they needed more funds. This additional 
contribution was supposed to put more costs onto individual users of healthcare if they were 
hesitant to switch to other SHI with lower or no additional contributions. The opportunity for 
higher-income individuals to opt out to PHI was subject to the condition of exceeding the 
Annual Income Limit for three consecutive years. Furthermore, the general contribution rate 
was determined by law at 15.5 per cent, from which employers had to pay 0.9 per cent less 
than employees. Instead of cutting services, the reform added several services such as 
vaccinations to the SHI’s catalogue. In addition, the reform paved the way for all citizens to 
re-join a health insurance scheme even if they had been rejected previously. These kind of 
slight recalibration measures were supposed to enhance health quality among the population 
and did not put any extra costs onto users. 
In how far do the reform measures match with the expected preferences of 
CDU/CSU? The implemented strategies for cost containment enhanced the competition 
between the SHI but also between SHI and PHI. The SHI had to compete with each other for 
new members regardless of their medical history or income. The users were granted more 
choices to switch health insurances to punish inefficient performance, thus enhancing the 
competition. Moreover the insured persons faced a risk of bearing higher individual costs in 
case they did not carry out their personal responsibility. The change of the contribution rate 
further developed a different contribution structure between employers and employees in 
favour of the employers. The recalibration measures were supposed to improve healthcare 
quality and meet the party’s preferences. Overall, all of the reform actions matched with the 
expected preferences of CDU/CSU. Therefore, I expect that the party to endorsed the policy 
in the discourse.  
In the political discourse the party stated that further reforming of the healthcare 
system was necessary for securing healthcare quality and sustainable financing. For this 
purpose, various party speakers emphasised the significance of the Act for Strengthening 
Competition in the SHI for more competition and a new, rather efficient financing structure. 
The party highlighted its satisfaction with the advancing decoupling of healthcare costs from 
non-wage labour costs. In addition, CDU/CSU appreciated the secured healthcare quality and 
presented the inclusion of all citizens into health insurances without any cutbacks as a great 
achievement and claimed the reform was made for the insured persons. The reform policy 
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matched the expected policy preferences of the Christian Democrats. They, in turn, expressed 
their satisfaction with the reform and justified the measures as being necessary to secure the 
healthcare system. 
In how far did the reform meet the policy preferences of the SPD? The Healthcare Fund 
integrated another redistributive element to the healthcare financing without putting more 
costs on users. In contrast, the unequal general contribution rate and in particular the 
additional contribution rate disadvantaged insured persons and paved the way for putting 
more costs on the users. Therefore, the party preferences were only met partly regarding the 
financing structure changes. The SPD was supposed to support the enhanced competition 
between SHI, which granted the users with more choices and control. But it was assumed to 
oppose a competition that also enhances the fragmentation of healthcare, which is represented 
by the stronger competition of SHI and PHI. Overall, the policy preferences of the Social 
Democrats are only met partly by the Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI. Thus, I 
assume that the party revealed an indecisive attitude in the discourse.  
However, the political discourse of the SPD was characterised by a positive attitude 
towards the reform. The combination of the reintegration of all citizens into healthcare 
insurance, enhancing the competition among SHI in a SPD-favoured manner and having no 
cutbacks was seen as the result of Social Democratic work. The party appreciated the 
implementation of the Healthcare Fund and expected the SHI to work even more efficiently 
while competing for all individuals and not just for the ones with lower risks or higher 
incomes. The SPD recognised the healthcare system as securing solidarity through the reform 
measures and passionately defended the policy against oppositional critique. Although the 
expected preferences of the SPD were only matched partly, the party strictly endorsed the 
reform in the political discourse. 
5.3.3 Discourse Analysis of the Financing Act of SHI   
The following section examines the preferences and discourse regarding the Financing 
Act of SHI from CDU/CSU as the government-leading party and then SPD as an oppositional 
party. 
The reform did not enact any cutbacks of healthcare services nor recalibration 
measures. Instead, the focus was on the remaining cost containment strategies regarding 
financing structure and competition among health insurances. The general contribution rate 
was reset from 14.9 to 15.5 per cent and employers had to contribute 7.3 per cent and 
employees 8.2 per cent. The employers’ share was frozen at this value and it was determined 
that only the employees would pay for rising healthcare costs in the future. They were 
charged a non-income-related additional contribution that was set only by an SHI that 
demanded more funds. This way, the reform clearly intended to put extra costs onto 
individual users while again relieving the employers. However the choice was still granted to 
the users to switch to another SHI or PHI to avoid extra costs. The insured persons were 
allowed to switch to PHI after exceeding the Annual Income Limit for only one year. The 
administrative costs of SHI were frozen for the next two years. All these measures were 
supposed to enhance the competition between SHI and PHI and encourage SHI to perform 
more efficiently. The costs of this competition were not put onto users but the system 
fragmentation between SHI and PHI was intensified. 
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How did the reform match with the expected policy preferences of CDU/CSU? The 
reform again emphasised the personal responsibility of insured persons to switch to cheaper 
SHI or PHI in order to avoid higher costs. Furthermore, the competition was strengthened 
within the fragmented structure, offering more options for higher-income individuals. This 
way more choices were granted to the users. These measures match the CDU/CSU 
preferences. The changes in financing structure aimed at decreasing the non-wage labour 
costs. These were decoupled from rising healthcare costs by freezing the employers’ share. In 
contrast, the insured persons had to bear extra costs introduced by the new lump-sum 
additional contribution. Overall, these reform measures matched with the expected 
preferences of the Christian Democrats. Therefore, I expect that the party to strictly supported 
the reform in the parliamentary debates.  
The party welcomed the new additional contribution for insured persons as well as the 
fixed value for the employers’ share as great achievements. These measures were appreciated 
as making labour cheaper, thus decreasing unemployment and giving more incentives to 
insured persons to switch to a better performing or cheaper SHI. CDU/CSU recognised the 
urgent need to reform the healthcare system in order to decrease financial pressure on it. The 
party criticised other political actors, in particular the SPD, for not taking the responsibility to 
act. Overall, CDU/CSU expressed its contentment with the reform policy, which matched the 
expected preferences of the party. The reform was justified as solving the estimated deficit of 
the healthcare system. 
In how far did the Financing Act of SHI meet the expected preferences of the SPD? 
The changes in financing structure continued to disadvantage the insured persons and reduced 
the redistributive character by introducing a non-income-related additional contribution. Thus, 
the reform placed more costs on the individual healthcare users. This contradicted the 
expected policy preferences of the SPD. The enhanced competition between SHI and PHI 
increased the fragmentation within the healthcare system. At the same time, the SHI also had 
stronger competition with each other in order to encourage more cost-efficient performances. 
Thus, the competition strategies did partly not match the expected preferences of SPD. 
Overall, the party’s preferences were mostly not met by the Financing Act of SHI. For this 
reason, I assume that the SPD vehemently disapproved the act in the discourse. 
Indeed, the SPD refused the changes in the financing structure and claimed it was not 
socially compatible and disadvantaged people with lower or middle incomes. The non-
income-related additional contribution was perceived as the introduction of a capitation fee 
and strictly opposed by the party. The SPD criticised the competition related strategies for 
strengthening the position of PHI against the SHI instead of equalising it. The party depicted a 
future healthcare system as a three-class system in which wealthier individuals would be 
provided with higher healthcare quality than the rest of the population. Overall, the SPD 
perceived the reform as a threat to the welfare state and strongly refused to support it. This fits 
to the expected policy preferences of the party. 
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5.3.4 Discourse Analysis of the Act for the further Development of 
 the Financial Structure and the Quality of SHI 
The next section scrutinises the discourse and party preferences related to the Act for 
the further Development of the Financial Structure and the Quality of SHI by the government 
leading party CDU/CSU, followed by the government coalition partner SPD. 
The reform policy conducted crucial changes in the financing structure of SHI. Both 
the additional special contribution of 0.9 per cent as well as the lump-sum additional 
contribution were cancelled, setting the contribution rate for employees at 7.3 per cent. Thus, 
the insured persons were relieved from extra costs and the general financing of healthcare was 
again equalised between employers and employees. The fragmentation was reduced by 
decreasing the contribution rate for employees hence giving fewer incentives to switch to PHI 
for reasons of cost-avoidance. The SHI were allowed to charge an income-related additional 
contribution with a more redistributive character from the insured persons only in case they 
needed more funds. This way the act created the opportunity to put additional costs onto users 
in a more collective way compared to the lump-sum additional contributions of the Financing 
Act of SHI in 2011. However, the competition among SHI was enhanced by granting a 
special right of termination to the insured persons in case SHI charged or raised the additional 
contribution. The SHI were obliged to inform their members about the opportunity to switch 
to another and cheaper SHI. Moreover, the social compensation for insured persons with 
lower income was cancelled and the SHI were not allowed to pay out bonus to its members 
anymore. Thus, the reform provided the users with greater incentives to avoid the additional 
costs and encouraged the SHI to operate more cost-efficient. The users were again granted the 
choices to act self-responsible. There were no more cutbacks or recalibration measures 
enacted. 
How did the Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure and the 
Quality of PHI meet the expected policy preferences of CDU/CSU? The reform enhanced the 
competition among SHI while slightly decreasing the fragmentation. The insured persons with 
higher income were provided with fewer financial incentives to switch to PHI. However, the 
general regularities that made switching to PHI less complicated were still kept in force. 
Furthermore, the insured persons were granted choices and more incentives to actively avoid 
extra costs. Therefore, these measures matched the expected preferences of CDU/CSU only 
partly. The financing structure was changed in favour of the insured persons by cancelling 
several additional costs. Nevertheless, the employers did not have to bear any extra costs 
continuing the policy of the Financing Act of SHI. Although CDU/CSU was supposed to 
prefer an individual to a collective cost structure, the party was assumed to appreciate the 
additional contribution for the users in order to encourage them exercising more personal 
responsibility. Again, the party’s preferences were only met partly. Thus, while the reform did 
not adhere to the expected preferences of CDU/CSU, it was not completely contradictive to 
their stance. Therefore, I expect that CDU/CSU perceived the reform in an indecisive way.  
Various CDU/CSU representatives regret the cancellation of the lump-sum additional 
contribution and emphasised that making compromises often requires trade-offs. On the other 
side the party was highly satisfied with the reductions of contributions in general as well as 
the fixed contribution rate for employers. The party declared that lower contribution for 
healthcare are fostering the economy. CDU/CSU appreciated the further developments of 
competition among SHI. Moreover, the party announced that the additional contribution in 
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combination with the right of termination creates a price competition based on the additional 
contribution. Thus, the SHI was assumed to be strongly encouraged to operate more cost-
efficiently. Although the reform did not meet the party’s preferences, the Christian Democrats 
perceived the reform being necessary to counteract estimated rising healthcare costs in the 
future. The attitude of CDU/CSU was surprisingly positive. 
In how far did Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure and the 
Quality of SHI match with the expected preferences of the SPD? The cancellations of both the 
additional special and additional contribution as a lump-sum relieved the users and weakened 
the cost-related incentives for higher-income individuals to switch to PHI. Thus, the 
fragmentation of the healthcare system was slightly decreased. The implemented additional 
contribution was redesigned by substituting the lump-sum element with an income-related 
structure. Hence, the extra costs were redistributed among individuals with different income 
levels, strengthening the redistributive and collective character of the SHI’s financing 
structure. Therefore, the measure targeting the financing structure mostly matched with the 
expected preferences of the Social Democrats, even though the party is assumed to oppose 
extra costs on the users. The enhanced competition granted more choices to the users. Insured 
persons were allowed to switch faster and less complicated to more cost-efficient SHI in case 
of rising additional contributions. The SHI had to outline the costs for their members more 
transparently and faced the risk to lose members in response of rising additional contributions. 
Nevertheless, insured persons that were hesitant or not used to carry out the personal 
responsibility were burdened with extra costs. The changes of the competition among the SHI 
matched the assumed preferences of SPD rather more than CDU/CSU. Overall, the reform 
mostly adhered to the expected policy preferences of the Social Democrats. Thus, I assume 
that the SPD appreciated the reform in a stronger way than CDU/CSU. 
How did the party perceive the reform in its political discourse? The SPD emphasised 
its contentment about the cancellation of the lump-sum additional contribution, which was 
perceived as a small capitation fee that disadvantaged lower-income individuals. Moreover, 
the Social Democrats highlighted that the healthcare system becomes more just. The SPD also 
appreciated the enhanced competition among the SHI and declared the income compensation 
for SHI within the risk structure compensation scheme as a key measure for a socially fair 
competition. Nevertheless, the party articulated critique on the reform for not going far 
enough and still preventing the employers to contribute a greater share to healthcare 
financing. The SPD announced that main objective has to be to change the entire healthcare 
structure by introducing the citizen insurance. However, the party justified the reform for 
being a compromise of the government coalition thus the result of negotiations and trade-offs 
for both sides. 
Although the reform mostly matched the expected policy preferences of the SPD, the 
party partly criticised the reform for being too reluctant. The Social Democrats even justified 
their support for the reform. Therefore, the SPD expressed its satisfaction with the Act for the 
further Development of the Financial Structure and the Quality of SHI not in a particular 
stronger way than CDU/CSU. 
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6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter puts the central statements of the previous sections into context with the 
findings of the analysis. This way, the findings of the analysis can be discussed in order to 
conclude the final statements of this paper.  
The organisational level of the German healthcare system is fundamentally determined 
by the interaction of SHI, PHI, hospitals, physicians and insured persons. Several laws and 
principles regulate and control the access and terms of healthcare. The German population is 
covered by health insurance that relates to medical treatments. The greatest share of the health 
insurances’ revenues is borne by the insured persons, either through income-related 
contributions from both employers and employees (SHI) or premium-based payments (PHI).  
The costs of healthcare in Germany sharply increased during the last decades. The 
share of healthcare costs in relation to the GDP rose from six per cent in 1970 to more than 
ten per cent in 2001, while the total healthcare expenditures increased ten-fold during this 
time period. The revenues and costs of the healthcare system were unbalanced and led to a 
deficit for the SHI. This paper identifies various reasons for this situation. The technological 
progress increased the price for healthcare and the aging population needed more extensive 
medical treatments. Moreover, the period of economic austerity after the oil crisis in the 
1970s hampered economic growth and prosperity. Growing unemployment in turn 
undermined the financial pillar of healthcare by reducing the revenues for SHI. 
The healthcare system was in need of reform, which aimed to rebalance healthcare 
financing without depressing the economy by increasing the contribution rate. This would 
also increase the non-wage labour costs, thus increasing labour costs and hamper the struggle 
against unemployment. However, the decrease of unemployment is the programmatic 
objective of both dominating parties in German politics, SPD and CDU/CSU. Thus, other 
reform policies had to be considered.  
This paper introduces several possible reform options with a strong focus on market-
oriented reforms. It examined the different options for public service markets and what the 
consequences for insured persons as users of such markets would look like. Moreover, the 
strategies for cost containment and recalibration are elucidated and identified regarding the 
reform policies. The healthcare reforms are substantially designed by political actors. 
Therefore, the preferences of the SPD and CDU/CSU concerning the different markets and 
reform options needed to be examined.  
For this purpose, the theoretical concept of partisanship is applied as a foundation for 
the traditional and market-oriented power resource theory. These theoretical frameworks 
provide profound information about what to expect about the preferences of the political left 
and right regarding welfare state retrenchment and expansion. The traditional power resource 
theory emphasises the significance of Social Democratic parties for welfare expansion and 
right parties for welfare cutbacks. However, this position does not explain why the SPD 
substantially participated in the decision-making process of reforms that implemented more 
market mechanisms within the healthcare system. The theoretical idea of market-oriented 
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power resources introduces different market types and explains the policy preferences of the 
typical partisan camps, which I linked to SPD and CDU/CSU. According to Gingrich (2011), 
the left parties do not hesitate to implement market mechanisms into public services to 
counteract budget or quality issues. However, left parties prefer to assign control within the 
market to the users or the state, maintain a more universal level of access to the service and 
aim at achieving a collective financing structure. In contrast, the right parties favour allocating 
more control to private producers of services and amplifying the fragmentation among 
individuals within the service structure. The Right is expected to seek lower public 
expenditures and is less hesitant to put more costs onto users. 
The main analysis section of this paper scrutinises the political discourse of SPD and 
CDU/CSU in relation to the selected healthcare reforms. According to the theoretical 
considerations of this thesis, the SPD is expected to support market-oriented reforms in order 
to enhance competition among SHI forcing health insurances to increase cost-efficiency. The 
party is supposed to disapprove of both extra costs on the users and a growing fragmentation 
of the benefit structure. The SPD is assumed to seek measures that maintain or strengthen the 
redistributional character of healthcare.  
In contrast, the Christian Democrats are supposed to endorse expenditure reducing 
reforms including cutbacks of healthcare benefits in a considerably stronger way than the 
SPD. Moreover, CDU/CSU is assumed to aim at reducing the financial burden of employers 
and being less hesitant to put more costs on the individual users. The party is expected to 
prefer market reforms, which stimulate the competition among health SHI and between SHI 
and PHI, while requesting more personal responsibility and choices for the insured persons. 
The expected party preferences are utilised to draw a line between the reforms and the 
parties’ discourse. For this purpose, the reform acts are examined considering the strategies 
for cost containment and recalibration.  
The discourse analysis of this paper presents interesting findings. In the political 
discourse the Social Democrats supported the Act on the Modernisation of the SHI as well as 
the Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI, although the former policy was mostly and 
the latter one partly in conflict with the expected preferences of the party. Although the party 
was involved in designing the reforms, both policies put more costs on insured persons. The 
competition elements were so small that they did not outweigh the extra burden for the users. 
The SPD strongly rejected the Financing Act of SHI in its discourse and acted as 
expected, since the reform mostly contradicted the party’s preferences. On the other hand, the 
Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure and the Quality of SHI matched 
mostly with the SPD’s preferences. The party expressed its satisfaction with the policy but 
endorsed it in a weaker way than CDU/CSU. Overall, the SPD supported two reforms it was 
not expected to but disapproved of one reform as expected. The fourth policy was endorsed in 
a weaker way than assumed. 
The Christian Democrats expressed their contentment with the reform policies of the 
Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI and the Financing Act of SHI and justified their 
support due to the budget constraints of the healthcare system. Both reform policies actually 
matched the expected preferences of CDU/CSU. The party acted as assumed.  
However, CDU/CSU took great efforts to justify its endorsement of Act on the 
Modernisation of the SHI, although the policy mostly met its preferences. Finally, the party 
expressed its satisfaction with the Act for the further Development of the Financial Structure 
and the Quality of SHI. This is an unexpected outcome, because the reform adhered the least 
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to the party’s expected preferences and even the SPD criticised the act. Overall, the 
CDU/CSU supported four reforms, all of which adhered to its preferences in most cases. The 
party justified its position in two cases much stronger than expected.  
How can these findings of at least partly contradicting discourse and party preferences 
towards the reforms be explained?  
The parties utilised the discourse to justify their support for the healthcare reforms, 
even in cases when the reform measures actually matched the party’s preferences. It can be 
stated that by justifying instead of purely endorsing a reform the parties do not intend to 
refuse the policy. The justification could rather be seen as a strategy to explain and legitimise 
each particular reform in order to follow vote seeking preferences and avoid the electoral 
blame for unpopular political decisions.  
The reforms were designed in a way that mostly matched with CDU/CSU preferences. 
Even though the party kept on justifying its support, the endorsement actually fit to the 
expected preferences in most cases. The SPD had contradictive preferences for the markets in 
three out of four reforms. The Social Democrats participated in the government coalition 
when two of those three reforms were enacted. Why did the expected preferences not meet the 
policy outcome? Why did the SPD – at least in two cases - support healthcare reforms that do 
not fit to their expected partisan preferences? The concepts of partisanship and power 
resources cannot answer this question sufficiently, since the SPD actually had access to the 
political power resources.  
The budget constraints related to healthcare could have a greater impact on the parties 
than estimated. The parties shared the assessment that the deficit in financing determined the 
need for reforms. In this regard, it can be of great importance that the SPD was part of the 
government and also needed to prove its capability to act and take responsibility, even 
accepting that the introduced measures could contradict the party’s core preferences. 
Nevertheless, a minority of SPD representatives in the parliament rejected the Act on the 
Modernisation of the SHI and the Act for Strengthening Competition in the SHI. The party 
was partly divided due to the essential reform measures. It can be considered that the party 
needed the parliamentary support from CDU/CSU in order to conduct the reform project. It is 
not the only instance that the SPD accepted the support from CDU/CSU to enact path-
breaking reforms, considering the cross-party alliance for the Hartz labour market reforms. 
Overall, the budget constraints could have such overwhelming effects on the SPD that 
considerations of partisanship were weakened. Furthermore, the programmatic shift of the 
Social Democrats towards the new middle could be seen as more advanced than this paper 
assumed. In such a case, it would be necessary to reconsider the theoretical classification of 
the SPD as a traditional Social Democratic party.   
Further research could focus on applying the same research method of discourse 
analysis with a different welfare area. These areas could be seen in labour market, family or 
pension policies and the discourse could be oriented on the main political actors as well. 
Another research could be conducted by utilising the same method and policy area on a 
different country, which healthcare system is similar to the German one. For this purpose, the 
healthcare reforms in the Netherlands appear to be an appropriate study subject. Finally, a 
very similar study set-up could be conducted while concentrating on the discourse and policy 
preferences of other important actors. These actors can be seen in employers, trade unions or 
the other parties in the federal parliament. This way, the gaps that are unintentionally left by 
this thesis, could be filled.  
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